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The topic of this thesis is how existing limitations and exceptions to copyright address 
the conflict between the economic interests of rightsholders and the interests of users in 
producing and disseminating user-generated content. Creative appropriation is heavily 
present in user-generated content in the Web 2.0. However, appropriative expressions 
often clash with copyright. Technological developments have resulted in the expansion 
of exclusive rights at the expense of limitations and exceptions. The concerns of 
rightsholders are increasingly focused on protecting economic interests. The thesis 
utilizes the legal dogmatic approach and the comparative legal method with a focus on 
the US, Canadian, and EU jurisdictions. Microcomparative comparison between the 
jurisdictions examines how each of them have addressed the balancing of interests 
between rightsholders and users in their limitations and exceptions. The political and 
historical contexts of the jurisdictions are discussed on a macrocomparative level. The 
main sources are constitutional authorities, statutory copyright legislation and case-law 
of each of the jurisdictions. References are also made to international treaties, such as 
Berne, TRIPS, WCT and WPPT. The main findings of the thesis are that US fair use 
accepts a wide range of purposes – many of which pertain to user-generated content. 
However, the ambiguous nature of the doctrine may be a hurdle for users. In Canadian 
copyright law, user-generated content benefits from a fair dealing exception and a non-
commercial UGC exception, which are to be interpreted widely and without unduly 
limiting users’ rights. EU copyright law recognizes the need to balance between the 
interests of rightsholders and users, but limitations and exceptions are interpreted strictly 
and regarded as derogations to exclusive rights. The approach in EU lacks the 
mechanisms and flexibilities to effectively respond to and protect the new user-generated 
types of expressions prominent in the Web 2.0. The thesis concludes that an imperative 
step for the EU is to elevate limitations and exceptions to copyright to the same level as 
exclusive rights. Additionally, a combination of a specific exception for non-commercial 
user-generated content and a (semi-)open-ended exception allows for effective balancing 
between rightsholders’ and users’ interests. A wider-scale examination of the different 
aspects of copyright law that impact user-generated content is required in order to better 
understand the effects and normative potential of the exceptions analyzed in this thesis. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1.  Background 
 
Creative appropriation refers to the repurposing and re-contextualizing of an existing 
creative work or elements of it into a new work.1 Appropriation as a creative method can 
be used to convey new and original ideas through the use of existing expressions.2 
Appropriation has occurred long before modern copyright laws were adopted and has 
always played a fundamental role in creative processes and in artistic and self-expression. 
Borrowing and taking inspiration from existing works has been common practice 
throughout history: artists have often re-examined existing works through new artistic 
styles or based their own work on existing ones.3 Creative works are never created in a 
complete social or cultural vacuum.4 Creators themselves are influenced by other existing 
works and are often engaged in a reciprocal relationship with the cultural dialogue 
surrounding such works.  
 
Whilst creative appropriation has been common throughout history, it became 
particularly prominent in the post-modern art movement beginning roughly in the 1960s. 
Appropriation was also important in post-modern arts’ indirect precursor, the avant-garde 
period, which encompassed movements such as Dadaism, Cubism and Surrealism.5 These 
movements utilized creative styles, such as collage and conceptual art, that made heavy 
use of appropriation.6 Post-modernism developed as a reaction to modernism and cannot 
 
1 Sherman, Brad. “Appropriating the Postmodern: Copyright and the Challenge of the New.” 
Social & Legal Studies, vol. 4, 1995, p. 32. 
2 Attas, Daniel. “Lockean Justifications of Intellectual Property.” Intellectual Property and 
Theories of Justice, edited by Gosseries et al, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 43; Lewis, Nicholas 
B. “Shades of Grey: Can the Copyright Fair Use Defense Adapt to New Re-Contextualised Forms 
of Music and Art.” American University Law Review, vol. 55, no. 1, 2005, p. 270. 
3 Irvin, Sherri. “Appropriation and Authorship in Contemporary Art.” British Journal of 
Aesthetics, vol. 45, no. 2, 2005, p. 124; Sherman, 1995, p. 32. 
4 Attas, 2008, p. 43; Lessig, Lawrence. Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid 
Economy. Penguin Press, 2008, p. 8; Knobel, Michele and Lankshear, Colin (eds.). A New 
Literacies Sampler. Peter Lang Publishing, 2007, p. 2. 
5 Carlin, John. “Culture Ventures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property Law.” 
Columbia-VLA Journal of Law & the Arts, vol. 13, no. 1, 1988, pp. 108-109; Gaggi, Silvio. 
Modern/Postmodern: A Study in Twentieth-Century Arts and Ideas. University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2015, pp. 20-21. 
6 Carlin, 1988, p. 106; Gaggi, 2015, pp. 20-21. 
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be defined without reference to it. Modernism refers to the philosophical and artistic 
movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Modernism based itself on 
philosophical grounds that emphasized the objective reality, the individual and 
humanistic, often utopian, values.7 Post-modernism sought to critique, transcend or even 
reject these philosophical grounds. Different forms of appropriation, such as borrowing 
images, quoting, paraphrasing et cetera, were often used in re-examining the nature of 
‘objective’ reality against other realities and universal truths against a multitude of 
meanings.8 The extent and form of appropriation in creative works and the subsequent 
subversion of the original vary widely. The post-modern ethos of invoking new meanings 
through appropriation, and consequent re-contextualizing and subversion of the original, 
can perhaps most explicitly be seen in the works of the French avant-garde artist Marcel 
Duchamp. In his ‘readymade’ art, Duchamp placed real-life everyday objects, such as a 
latrine, into a gallery context.9 In another famous ‘readymade’ work, he drew a moustache 
and a beard onto a picture of Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa.10 Even though 
appropriation has always been an integral part of creative expression, it has been 
continually challenged ever since the adoption of modern copyright laws. 
 
Lawrence Lessig described the relationship between creativity and appropriation as 
follows: “The new builds on the old, and hence depends, to a degree, on access to the 
old”.11 Certain works will become so influential that they enter into mass culture and 
become part of a common cultural language. Appropriation of such works, which carry 
culturally specific connotations, may be imperative in order to express certain ideas 
without modifying or losing their meaning completely.12 However, appropriation directly 
conflicts with the exclusive right of authors and copyright owners to reproduce copies of 
their work in whole or in part, and in conjunction potentially clashes with numerous other 
 
7 Gaggi, 2015, pp. 18-19, 21.  
8 Ibid., pp. 20-21; Lewis, 2005, p. 281. 
9 Duchamp, Marcel. Fountain. 1916/1964; Irvin, p. 124; Landes, William M. and Posner, Richard 
A. The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law. Harvard University Press, 2003, p. 260; 
Lewis, 2005, p. 281. 
10 Duchamp, Marcel. L.H.O.O.Q. 1919/1964; Carlin, 1988, p. 109; Sherman, 1995, p. 32. 
11 Lessig, Lawrence. The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World. 
Random House, 2001, p. 105. 
12 Couto, Alexandra. “Copyright and Freedom of Expression: A Philosophical Map.” Intellectual 
Property and Theories of Justice, edited by Gosseries et al, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 166; 
Lessig, Lawrence. Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy. Penguin 
Press, 2008, pp. 74-76. 
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exclusive rights – a list which has expanded over time. The term itself “is a provocation; 
‘appropriation’ of protected work connotes stealing”.13  The shift to the Web 2.0 era has 
fostered online participatory cultures in which users can engage, create and share content 
with significant ease and at virtually no cost, meaning that the risk of copyright 
infringement is also constantly present. Thus, appropriation raises numerous difficult 
questions in relation to copyright law.14 In the essay The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction, German literary critic Walter Benjamin argued that large-scale 
reproduction enabled by technological advancement lessens and emancipates the ‘aura’ 
(i.e. the authenticity and its tie with tradition and artistic ritual) of a work and changes the 
social function and the relationship that art has with the public.15 This new environment 
allows and encourages the examination and re-contextualization of existing works. In the 
past, when the scope of copyright law was significantly smaller and exclusive rights were 
not as extensive, appropriation was less problematic in legal terms and a wide spectrum 
of works would regularly enter the public domain that allowed for legal use of such works. 
Lessig argues that “in our present legal regime, some of [past] content is free; some is 
controlled”, and the scope of copyright has continued to widen as technologies have 
improved.16 Simultaneously, appropriation has become even more prevalent in creative 
expression and both our culture and social environments are dominated by commercial 
mass imagery.17 Appropriation, and at present particularly its use in online user-generated 
content, represents “a most radical challenge to the copyright laws to date”.18  
 
1.2. Research question 
 
The main research question of the thesis is: “To what extent does a specific exception for 
non-commercial user-generated content (UGC) or, alternatively, an open-ended 
exception to copyright address the conflict between the economic interests of 
 
13 Landes, 2003, p. 261. 
14 Attas, 2008, p. 44. 
15 Benjamin, Walter and Jennings, Michael W. “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological 
Reproducibility [First Version]”. Grey Room, no. 39, 2010, pp. 14, 17, 29; Tang, Xiyin. “That 
Old Thing, Copyright: Reconciling the Postmodern Paradox in the New Digital Age”. AIPLA 
Quarterly Journal, vol. 39, no. 1, 2011, p. 76.  
16 Boyle, James. The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind. Yale University Press, 
2008, p. 40; Lessig, 2001, pp. 105-106. 
17 Carlin, 1988, pp. 110-111.  
18 Sherman, 1995, pp. 32-33.  
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rightsholders and the interest of users to produce and disseminate UGC?”. The United 
States and Canada both contain an open-ended and a semi-open-ended exception, 
respectively, in their national legislation. In the United States, the fair use doctrine is 
well-established, and several Commonwealth jurisdictions have a tradition of fair 
dealing. Canada has amended its fair dealing provisions and introduced a specific 
exception for non-commercial user-generated content into its Copyright Act in 2012. The 
following sub-question is also answered: “To this end, should a specific or open-ended 
exception, or both, be included in European Union law?”. Based on the features 
mentioned above, the US and Canadian jurisdictions are generally considered to be more 
well-equipped to address unforeseen uses of works, such as online user-generated content 
that appropriate existing copyright-protected works, than jurisdictions that do not have 
similar features, such as the European Union.  
 
1.3. Methodology and sources 
 
The thesis utilizes the legal dogmatic approach and the comparative legal method with a 
focus on the US, Canadian, and EU jurisdictions.19 The thesis focuses mainly on 
microcomparative comparison between the jurisdictions, examining how each of them 
have approached and addressed the balancing of interests between rightsholders and users 
in their copyright legislation and case-law.20 However, the political and historical 
contexts of the constitutional and statutory legal frameworks of the different jurisdictions 
and how these have influenced their respective laws are discussed on a macrocomparative 
level.21 The aim of the comparison is to analyze whether similar doctrines to fair use or 
fair dealing could be implemented or developed in European Union law.  
 
Various sources at constitutional, statutory and case-law levels are examined. In 
discussing the scope of modern copyright law, the thesis also references international 
treaties, such as the Berne Convention, the TRIPS Agreement and the WIPO ‘Internet 
Treaties’. These international sources are also relevant as the limitations and exceptions 
 
19 Smits, Jan M. “What is Legal Doctrine? On The Aims and Methods of Legal Dogmatic 
Research.” Rethinking Legal Scholarship: A Transatlantic Dialogue, edited by Gestel et al, 2017, 
p. 210, 213, 217, 220-221. 
20 Zweigert, Konrad and Kötz, Hein. An Introduction to Comparative Law. Translated by Tony 
Weir. Oxford University Press, 3rd ed. 1998, p. 5. 
21 Ibid., p. 4. 
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(L&Es) of the analyzed jurisdictions must comply with the three-step test. The thesis 
describes and assesses the statutory copyright laws containing the relevant limitations and 
exceptions with regards to user-generated content – fair use in the US, fair dealing and 
the specific UGC exception in Canada, and the parody and quotation exceptions in the 
EU – and their underlying policy concerns, particularly fundamental rights and copyright 
incentives for creativity. In terms of US law, focus is given to the United States 
Constitution and Title 17 of the United States Code concerning copyright, particularly the 
Copyright Act of 1976 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. As for Canada, the 
thesis concentrates on the Canadian Copyright Act with some discussion about the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. With regards to EU law, the thesis focuses 
particularly on the Information Society Directive, the Digital Single Market Directive and 
also references the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Case-law about the relevant limitations and 
exceptions from the above jurisdictions is also examined. There is a lack of case-law 
expressly about appropriative user-generated content in the jurisdictions. Thus, other 
cases concerning appropriation or the incorporation of a copyrighted-protected work into 
a new one, that provide analogies with user-generated content, were chosen.  
 
In terms of limitations, this thesis provides a comparison mainly between common law 
traditions and the European Union legal system. There is no focus on specific Member 
State jurisdictions per se, but the copyright legislation of Germany is indirectly discussed 
through the examination of EU case-law. The thesis focuses on a specific sub-category 
of user-generated content, namely user-derived content.22 However, some references are 
made to other forms of user-generated content and the genre of appropriation art in 
general. The thesis focuses mainly on the economic, and not the moral, interests of 
rightsholders. 
 
 
 
 
 
22 “Content that was created using parts of one or more pre-existing protected works that are then 
transformed, adapted, or recast in some way”, see Gervais, Daniel. “Derivative Works, User-
Generated Content, and (Messy) Copyright Rules.” Copyright & New Media Law, vol. 16, no. 1, 
2012, p. 7. 
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1.4. Structure 
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis sets out how technological developments, particularly the Web 
2.0, has enabled the spread of user-generated content and affected the scope of copyright 
law. The definition and various formats of user-generated content are discussed. The 
conflict and discrepancies between copyright law and user-generated content are also 
covered and how the current copyright discourse focuses on the economic incentives of 
authors and the concept of the ‘value-gap’. Chapter 3 goes into more detail about 
automated digital copyright measures, particularly filtering technologies, and how they 
affect online user-generated content. With regards to this topic, the thesis also discusses 
the recent EU copyright reform and the so-called ‘upload filtering provision’ Article 17. 
Chapter 4 analyzes and compares the various limitations and exceptions relevant to user-
generated content in the United States, Canada and the European Union and how these 
jurisdictions have managed to balance the interests of rightsholders and users. Based on 
these comparisons, Chapter 5 discusses possible solutions from the perspective of EU 
copyright law to achieve a better balance between these interests. Chapter 6 includes 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. USER-GENERATED CONTENT & COPYRIGHT IN THE WEB 2.0 ERA 
 
Both a changing ethos and technological advancements have greatly impacted the ways 
in which people communicate to each other (i.e. ‘literacies’) through various forms of 
content.23 Several drivers have led to the expansive growth and spread of user-generated 
content. Technological drivers include increased broadband availability, improved 
performance in consumer electronics, access by users to software tools that allow for the 
creation and editing of content, and the availability of online platforms for the hosting 
and sharing of user-generated content.24 Social drivers have also encouraged the growth 
of user-generated content, such as users and particularly younger age groups becoming 
increasingly adept at using the Internet and digital tools, the creation of online 
 
23 ‘Literacies’ refer to “socially recognized ways of generating, communicating, and negotiating 
meaningful content through the medium of encoded texts within contexts of participation in 
Discourses (or, as members of Discourses)”, Knobel et al, 2007, p. 8.  
24 Wunsch-Vincent, Sacha and Vickery, Graham. “Participative Web and User-Created Content: 
Web 2.0, Wikis and Social Networking.” OECD Publishing, 2007, pp. 27-28. 
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communities and spaces for people to interact in, and the spread of societal, political and 
creative discussion to the online sphere.25  
 
The participatory web of today “enables users to collaborate and contribute to developing, 
extending, rating, commenting on and distributing digital content”.26 Lessig argues that 
the participatory web and digital software tools have enabled a so-called Read/Write 
(RW) culture in which users do not merely consume culture, but also take part in “creating 
and re-creating the culture around them”.27 In contrast, the preceding and more traditional 
Read/Only (RO) culture did not encompass amateur creativity to a similar extent and 
users were seen as merely non-interactive ‘consumers’ of creative works.28 Currently, 
however, anyone is able to ‘remix’ content – i.e. copy, cut, rework and mix an original 
work or elements of it into a new work and publish or share it online for others to interact 
with and enjoy.29 The amount of original input or creative effort from the user that creates 
a remix work varies widely, just as in the case of appropriative art in general. 
 
Michele Knobel and Colin Lankshear describe that the new changing ethos and the shift 
from the Web 1.0 to the Web 2.0, a term popularized by Tim O’Reilly after the crash of 
the dot-com bubble in the early 2000s, has made content “less published, individuated 
and author-centric”.30 The Web 1.0 made static websites accessible to users, but allowed 
for little interaction with other users or even with the content itself. Instead it provided 
readymade content that was made available to users “in the form that their creators have 
designed”.31 The Web 2.0, on the other hand, gravitates towards web services through 
which users can collectively participate, collaborate and generate content. The users 
“remain the core of the value [of the service]”.32 Knobel and Lankshear describe that the 
ethos of inclusion and mass participation in the Web 2.0 invites everyone to contribute 
and create content.33 O’Reilly argues that one of the fundamental principles behind 
 
25 Wunsch-Vincent et al, pp. 28-29. 
26 Ibid., p. 17.  
27 Lessig, 2008, p. 28. 
28 Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
29 Knobel et al, 2007, p. 8; Lessig, 2008, p. 69.  
30 Knobel et al, 2007, p. 9. 
31 Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
32 O’Reilly, Tim. “What is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation 
of Software.” Communications & Strategies, no. 65, 2007, pp. 18, 22-24. 
33 Knobel et al, 2007, p. 18. 
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successful Web 2.0 platforms and services is embracing the ‘collective intelligence’ of 
the web and the effects from user contributions.34 Employing Lessig’s RO and RW 
dichotomy, the Web 1.0 was a Read/Only culture, whereas the Web 2.0 is a Read/Write 
culture. The Internet and the Web 2.0 have been enabling technologies and, as argued by 
Jane C. Ginsburg, have “given concrete effect to the post-modernist theory of the [user] 
as creator”.35 Users have moved from passive consumers to active participants in culture 
and creative processes. They contribute, collaborate and give meaning to creative works 
by interacting directly with these works and the surrounding cultural discourse(s). The 
participatory web has disrupted the hierarchical and traditional author-reader relationship 
and enabled the general public to take part in cultural and creative activities to an extent 
that has not been seen previously.36 The late cyberlibertarian essayist John Perry Barlow 
described the future of intellectual property similarly: in a digitized world ideas and 
expressions would come to exist as intangible information and act akin to thought.37 
According to Barlow, information would become ‘an activity’, ‘a life-form’ and ‘a 
relationship’. These statements reflect much of the characteristics of user-generated 
content. Information spreads continuously and is experienced, rather than possessed. 
Information evolves and interacts with its surroundings, i.e. with users and the cultures 
that they inhabit. And significantly, the value and meaning of information “depends 
entirely on the extent to which each individual receiver has the receptors - shared 
terminology, attention, interest, language [or] paradigm”.38 Thus, creative processes 
should be seen as interactive flows between multiple participants – including users that 
are now able to serve inputs to these processes.39 
 
Nevertheless, there is no commonly agreed definition for user-generated content. The 
OECD has described three central characteristics of user-generated content – UGC works 
 
34 O’Reilly, 2007, pp. 22-24.  
35 Ginsburg, Jane C. “Exceptional Authorship: The Role of Copyright Exceptions in Promoting 
Creativity.” The Evolution and Equilibrium of Copyright in the Digital Age, edited by Frankel et 
al, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 23-24. 
36 Ginsburg, 2014, p. 27; Knobel et al, 2007, p. 21; Lessig, 2008, p. 81.  
37 Barlow, John Perry. "The Economy of Ideas". WIRED, 1 Mar 1994. Available at 
<wired.com/1994/03/economy-ideas/>. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Elkin-Koren, Niva. "Copyright in a Digital Ecosystem: A User-Rights Approach." Copyright 
Law in an Age of Limitations and Exceptions, edited by Ruth L. Okediji, Cambridge University 
Press, 2017, p. 145-146. 
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are 1) published in some way, 2) contain a certain amount of creative effort, and 3) are 
created outside of professional routines and practices.40 These provide a good general 
outline, however, especially the two latter characteristics are increasingly difficult to 
assess. Daniel Gervais has divided user-generated content into three types: user-authored 
content (such as vacation pictures), user-copied content (content that copies a work 
without modification, such as pirated works) and user-derived content (“content that was 
created using parts of one or more pre-existing protected works that are then transformed, 
adapted, or recast in some way”).41 This thesis focuses on user-derived content, and 
particularly content that is in audio, visual or audiovisual form. These forms of user-
generated content are generally more targeted by (automated) digital copyright 
enforcement measures on online platforms.42  The terms ‘user-generated content’ and 
‘user-derived content’ are used interchangeably in this thesis. It would be an impossible 
task to list all the different categories and forms of user-derived content. However, to help 
exemplify the range of content out there, some popular categories in the field of 
audio/visual user-generated content can be identified, such as: 
- Mashups and other works employing a cut-up technique43 
- Lip-syncing videos44 
- Addition of a (different) audio track or subtitles to a video45 
- Image macros46 
 
40 Wunsch-Vincent et al, 2007, p. 9.  
41 Gervais, Daniel. “Derivative Works, User-Generated Content, and (Messy) Copyright Rules.” 
Copyright & New Media Law, vol. 16, no. 1, 2012, p. 7.  
42 Wunsch-Vincent et al, 2007, p. 32.  
43 Mashups involve combining two (or more) works, such as songs, together. Cut-up techniques 
involve ‘cutting up’ a work and rearranging its parts to create a new work. 
44 Lip syncing has been a form of performance and entertainment for a long time and is also 
extremely popular in the online sphere, as can be seen most recently from the success of social 
networking apps such as TikTok. 
45 A well-known example is the Downfall Hitler video phenomenon in which a user adds new and 
original subtitles to a scene from the 2004 German Film ‘Downfall’ (orig. Der Untergang): “[the 
user creates] a video that is, or is intended to be, humorous, with the humor largely derived from 
the incongruous and anachronistic content of the subtitles as well as from the inherently 
transgressive use of the original content for comic purposes”, see Schwabach, Aaron. 
“Reclaiming Copyright from the outside in: What the Downfall Hitler Meme Means for 
Transformative Works, Fair Use, and Parody.” Buffalo Intellectual Property Law Journal, vol. 8, 
no. 1, 2012, p. 1. 
46 Image macros feature a picture or an artwork which is superimposed with some form of text. 
Image macros often appropriate other copyrighted works. An example of a famous macro is the 
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- ‘Reaction’ gifs47 
 
Barlow’s description of information as a ‘life-form’ also aptly describes much of user-
generated content – the references used constantly develop and the meanings conveyed 
may vary depending on the receiver. Barlow also tied this characteristic to the 
phenomenon of “memes”. Knobel and Lankshear define memes as “contagious patterns 
of ‘cultural information’ that get passed from mind to mind and directly generate and 
shape the mindsets and significant forms of behavior and actions of a social group.”48 
Cross-referencing and connections between various cultural phenomena are common in 
memes.49 Memes serve a wide range of purposes, such as social commentary, absurdist 
humor or fan activity. Since memes and user-generated content are inherently social in 
nature, their existence and spread requires “networked human hosts”.50 User-generated 
content and its different forms have altogether permeated and become vital to the various 
spaces and communities in the online sphere.  
 
For example, a particularly popular meme and a target of remixing in recent years has 
been the ‘Distracted Boyfriend’ image macro. The meme utilizes a stock photo taken by 
the Spanish photographer Antonio Guillem.51 The photo shows a man walking with her 
girlfriend and looking at another woman, suggesting infidelity on the man’s part. The 
stock photo quickly became viral and users appropriated the photo to illustrate a range of 
other relatable situations based around unfaithfulness, such as a person skipping pressing 
duties to take a nap instead or having a pet cat prefer a cardboard box as a toy rather than 
an expensive climbing tree that the owner has purchased.52 The image was often also 
 
‘lolcat’ image format which combines pictures of cats with humorous and grammatically incorrect 
text. 
47 Reaction gifs are animated images that often appropriate from existing works. Users utilize 
them to convey a reaction or a feeling. The use of such gifs is very common on social media 
platforms and messaging applications. 
48 Knobel et al, p. 199. 
49 Ibid., p. 213. 
50 Ibid., p. 219. 
51 Guillem, Antonio. “Disloyal man walking with his girlfriend and looking amazed at another 
seductive girl”. Shutterstock. Available at <shutterstock.com/image-photo/disloyal-man-
walking-his-girlfriend-looking-297886754> [accessed 2 May 2020]. 
52 @gorewhore1234. Distracted Boyfriend image macro. Twitter, 24 Aug 2017. Available at: 
<twitter.com/gorewhore1234/status/900580223137263616> [accessed 2 May 2020]; 
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remixed with other copyrighted works. For example, the image bears similarities to a 
specific scene in the film Matrix.53 And once a certain work or meme becomes highly 
saturated online, users will often create memes about memes, i.e. ‘meta-memes’.54 
Guillem’s photo may be a royalty free stock photo, but it is still a copyright-protected 
work. Guillem has stated that using the photo without having paid the rights is illegal but 
he has decided not to sue anybody for the use of the image.55 Of course, he could 
nevertheless do so under current copyright laws. The decisions of rightsholders in 
enforcing their rights with regards to user-generated works and memes are often 
complicated and, to the dismay of users, arbitrary. 
 
The scope of discussion in this thesis does not cover user-generated content shared for 
purely commercial purposes, but often it may be difficult to distinguish between 
commercial and non-commercial UGC. Most of user-generated content is not created or 
shared online for profit and users rarely expect remuneration. As the amount of people 
using online platforms has skyrocketed and users have started producing more and more 
content, these platforms have begun to provide users with the means to monetize their 
content. This way both the platform and the user (and increasingly also the 
rightsholders56) may benefit monetarily from the uploaded content. Gradually, many 
users have become professional or semi-professional producers of content and a whole 
industry has risen around so-called “content creators”. Many online marketplaces benefit 
from users publishing and offering others the option to purchase their creations, such as 
fan art. Additionally, more ‘gray’ commercialization routes have surfaced, such as 
crowdfunding websites and monthly subscription or patronage-type platforms through 
which people can choose to financially support their favorite users and get access to more 
content. These monetization methods and services are not necessarily aimed only to 
 
@Hungryghoast (Hungryghoast). Distracted Boyfriend image macro. Twitter, 28 Aug 2017. 
Available at <twitter.com/Hungryghoast/status/902123601419231232> [accessed 2 May 2020].  
53 yuspd (username). “Distracted Boyfriend – woman in the red dress.” Know Your Meme, 2018. 
Available at <knowyourmeme.com/photos/1324109-distracted-boyfriend> [accessed 2 May 
2020]. 
54 @pixelatedboat (pixelatedboat aka “mr tweets”). Distracted Boyfriend image macro. Twitter, 
25 Aug 2017.  Available at: <twitter.com/pixelatedboat/status/900837129697214464> [accessed 
2 May 2020]. 
55 Guillem, Antonio. "Important information about copyright and privacy content infringement 
(EN/ES)". 5 July 2018, available at <antonioguillem.com/2018/07/05/copyright-and-privacy-
content-infringement/> [accessed 2 May 2020]. 
56 See discussion in Chapter 3. 
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people making user-derived content. However, from a copyright-perspective, the 
utilization of these services for the publishing and sharing of user-derived content is 
clearly problematic. The general conception has been that user-generated content is non-
commercial and created by amateurs. The majority of user-generated content certainly 
remains amateur. Nevertheless, based on the factors mentioned above, the distinction 
between commercial and non-commercial is often difficult to make. 
 
The term ‘user’ also has multiple connotations and meanings. Generally, it has referred 
to the consumer of the ‘end-product’ of a creative process and, indeed, many users still 
consume works in such a way. In the Web 2.0, however, users should rather be considered 
as “various type of players engaging with cultural works in a variety of ways”.57  Users 
have always utilized existing copyrighted works, whether through analogue or digital and 
online or offline formats. The Web 2.0 presupposes and requires a certain level of 
participation from users to generate and edit content – whether audio, visual or textual – 
in order to achieve its full benefits. 
 
2.1. Technology development and the scope of copyright law 
 
The scope of modern copyright law has broadened and is inherently tied to the 
technological developments from the 20th century onwards. The traditional focus of 
copyright on ‘copies’ and that digital technologies have enabled near costless copying of 
content, have encouraged copyright owners to seek extensive control of both the legal 
and the technical infrastructure relating to their works in the digital (and in the past even 
the analogue) domain.58 In the 1984 Betamax case, Universal Studios and Disney sued 
Sony for the manufacturing of home video tape recorders that, according to the 
respondents, could be used by consumers to infringe copyright.59 Universal Studios and 
Disney alleged that Sony was liable for contributory copyright infringement for assisting 
people to carry out copyright violations with their Sony home video tape recorders. 
However, the Supreme Court of the United States held that Sony was not liable since 
Betamax products were sold for legitimate purposes and had also other significant (and 
non-infringing) uses. The Court found that the recording of television programs for later 
 
57 Elkin-Koren, 2017, p. 135-136. 
58 Boyle, 2008, pp. 61-62. 
59 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
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viewing, when private and non-commercial, constituted fair use.60 Copyright owners have 
often tried to prevent or modify the adoption of new technologies and services that enable 
the reproduction of copyrighted works. Ironically, the popularity of home video recorders 
and videocassette technology turned out to be highly lucrative for copyright owners since 
people gained even more interest in consuming copyrighted works, and thus the cassette 
sale and rental industries generated significant amounts of revenue.61 Similarly at present, 
the disrupting technologies have provided new opportunities for rightsholders, yet the 
continued effort to extend the scope of copyright hinders their utilization.62  
 
The so-called ‘Internet Treaties’ – the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty – were adopted to ensure the application of 
exclusive rights also in the digital domain. Now rightsholders may “[authorize] any 
communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the 
making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public 
may access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them (emphasis 
added)”.63 The WIPO Internet Treaties were implemented in the EU through the 
Information Society Directive (InfoSoc) and in the United States via the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). The European Union included a making available 
right in Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive. Canada also amended its Copyright Act to 
contain a making available right.64 The United States did not amend its copyright 
legislation to include a specific making available right, but instead considers the existing 
exclusive rights in Title 17 of the United States Code to cover it.65 
 
These treaties also enable copyright owners to protect their works with technological 
protection measures (TPMs, also often referred to as digital rights management methods) 
 
60 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, p. 442. 
61 Boyle, 2008, p. 64.  
62 Ibid., pp. 63-65.  
63 WIPO Copyright Treaty [‘WCT’] (1996), 2186 UNTS 121, Art. 8. 
64 Copyright Act [‘Copyright Act 1985’], RCS 1985, c C-42, section 3(1)(f). The definition is 
found in section 2.4 (1.1.): “For the purposes of this Act, communication of a work or other 
subject-matter to the public by telecommunication includes making it available to the public by 
telecommunication in a way that allows a member of the public to have access to it from a place 
and at a time individually chosen by that member of the public.” 
65 United States Copyright Office. "The Making Available Right in the United States." U.S. 
Copyright Office, 2016, pp. 2-3. 
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and to prevent the circumvention of such measures.66 Both the DMCA, the InfoSoc 
Directive and the Canadian Copyright Act include provisions which prohibit the 
circumvention of TPMs to access and use copyrighted works without authorization.67 
TPMs contain methods such as encryption, password protection measures, verification 
measures, scrambling technologies, region blocking, watermarking, and the list 
continually grows as new technologies develop. The relationship between TPMs and the 
legal use of works, based for example on fair use, is complicated and exemplifies how 
the scope of copyright law has been extended at the cost of often limiting users’ ability to 
legally use a copyrighted work. In addition, the introduction of safe harbor provisions for 
online service providers in the DMCA and in the E-Commerce Directive (ECD) in the 
EU has resulted in the adoption of notice-and-takedown systems that have significant 
effects on user-generated content.68  
 
The scope of modern copyright has also been extended to derivative works. This is a 
fundamental change to the dynamics between appropriation in creative works and 
copyright. Previously, ‘derivative’ works were not considered as infringing ‘copies’.69 
The right of authors and copyright owners to create derivative works based on the original 
work is now contained in international and national copyright laws. The Berne 
Convention states that “translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other 
alterations [of a work] shall be protected as original works without prejudice to the 
copyright in the original work (emphasis added)”.70 The Information Society Directive 
does not explicitly discuss derivative works.71 However, the right of adaptation is 
 
66 WCT, Art. 11; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty [‘WPPT’] (1996), 2186 UNTS 
203, Art. 18 
67 Copyright Act 1985, section 41.1.; Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 
112 Stat. 2860, 2887 (title IV amending §108, §112, §114, chapter 7 and chapter 8, title 17, United 
States Code), enacted October 28, 1998, § 1201; Directive 2001/29/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society [‘InfoSoc Directive’], 2001 O.J. L 167/10, 
Art. 6. 
68 See Chapter 3 for more discussion. 
69 Zimmerman, Diane Leenheer. "Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?" 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law, vol. 12, no. 1, 2011, p. 56 
70 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works [‘Berne Convention’] 
(1886, as amended on 1979), 1161 UNTS, Art. 2(3). 
71 The Software and Database Directives does, however, state that authors have the exclusive right 
of adaptation or alteration of a copyright-protected database or software: Directive 96/9/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases 
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generally considered to be encompassed by the reproduction right in Article 2 of InfoSoc: 
“the exclusive right to authorize or prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or permanent 
reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in part... [for authors, of their 
works]”.72 United States copyright law defines derivative works as “work[s] based upon 
one or more pre-existing works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, 
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art 
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be 
recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, 
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of 
authorship, is a ‘derivative work’ (emphasis added)”.73 The interpretation of what 
constitutes a derivative work has been increasingly broadened. Derivative works are no 
longer merely concerned with different adaptation formats, such as abridgments or 
translations et cetera, but also the wider phenomena of appropriation in creative works.74 
And previously, even translations or abridgments were not considered as ‘copies’, but 
rather independent works of their own, since they did not contain the exact expression of 
the original work.75  
 
Generally, user-generated content that utilizes elements from an existing copyrighted 
work can certainly be considered derivative. Whether the borrowing of copyrighted 
elements is substantial enough that the UGC work constitutes derivative in a legal and 
copyright-infringing sense, is a more complicated question and warrants a case-by-case 
examination for which the rules are not always simple.76 The expansion of digital and 
online technologies have led to what James Boyle coins as “the Internet threat”. 
Rightsholders believe that the “strength of intellectual property rights must vary inversely 
with the cost of copying”, and thus the decentralized and open features of the Internet 
 
[‘Database Directive’], 1996 O.J. L 77/20, Art. 5(b); Directive 2009/24/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs 
[‘Software Directive’], 2009 O.J. L 111/16, Art 4(b).  
72 Bonetto, Giacomo. “Internet Memes as Derivative Works: Copyright Issues under EU Law.” 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, vol. 13, no. 12, 2018, p. 992; Painer v Standard 
VerlagsGmbH and Others, C-145/10, EU:C:2011:798. 
73 Title 17 of the United States Code, § 101. 
74 Zimmerman, 2011, p. 56. 
75 Miller, Arthur R. & Davis, Michael H. Intellectual Property: Patents, Trademarks and 
Copyright in a Nutshell. West Publishing, 5th ed., 2012, p. 345. 
76 Schwabach, Aaron. Fan Fiction and Copyright: Outsider Works and Intellectual Property 
Protection. Ashgate, 2011, p. 64. 
  
16 
 
must be sufficiently countered by technologies of control.77 Moreover, since copying 
content is costless, this logic requires that the level of control that copyright law and its 
enforcement measures exert must be near perfect.78 This expansion of scope is a 
significant change from the past and applies to all Internet users.79 Copyright law has 
become to regulate “the full range of creativity – commercial or not, transformative or 
not”.80 
 
2.2. The conflict between user-generated content and copyright law 
 
One of the fundamental tenets of copyright is the idea-expression dichotomy.81 Copyright 
protection is given to the expression of an idea, rather than the idea itself.82 However, the 
dichotomy can be difficult to discern and creative appropriation further complicates such 
analysis.83 For those that use appropriation to convey different ideas and meanings, the 
adopted expression “might be as important to its impact as the idea behind it”.84 
Consequently, the idea-expression dichotomy places at odds the exclusive rights of 
authors and copyright owners and the freedom of expression of users.85 Certain formats 
of copyrighted works may reinforce “the claim that freedom of speech cannot be properly 
served by simply describing the idea behind the expression”.86 Eleonora Rosati has 
argued that the idea-expression dichotomy is not necessarily a useful tool in solving 
difficult cases that require balancing copyright and freedom of expression, since the 
dichotomy itself is a ‘fallacy’ – “expressionless ideas do not exist: an idea can exist only 
 
77 Boyle, 2008, p. 60. 
78 Ibid., pp. 61-62. 
79 Lessig, 2008, pp. 138-139, 161.  
80 Lessig, 2001, pp. 106, 110.  
81 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [‘TRIPS’], (1994), 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 UNTS 299, 
Art. 9(2). 
82 Barendt, Eric. “Copyright and Free Speech Theory.” Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative 
and International Analyses, edited by Griffiths el al, Oxford University Press, 2005, para. 2.06. 
83 Rosati, Eleonora. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy at Crossroads: Past and Present of a 
Concept. Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010, pp. 25, 27. 
84 Macmillan, Fiona. “Commodification and Cultural Ownership.” Copyright and Free Speech: 
Comparative and International Analyses, edited by Griffiths el al, Oxford University Press, 2005, 
para. 3.04; Sherman, 1995, p. 39.  
85 Rosati, 2010, p. 13. 
86 Macmillan, 2005, para. 3.33. 
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if it can be expressed”.87 Thus, applying the dichotomy to the current challenges 
surrounding user-generated content and copyright infringement may be more of a 
hindrance than a help in solving them. The increasingly broadening right to make 
derivative works also undermines the legitimacy of the idea/expression dichotomy. 
 
The idea-expression dichotomy is closely related to authorship and particularly the 
concept of the ‘romantic author’ who creates something original purely from the workings 
of their own mind, and thus should be granted a property-like right to their creation.88 
This approach suggests that user-derived works do not warrant similar protection under 
copyright law.  Furthermore, the concept implies that an author’s creativity and originality 
exist independently of other influences and that authors are immune from appropriating 
elements into their own works. Post-modern literary theorists Roland Barthes and Michel 
Foucault, however, argued that the author has become wholly irrelevant since all works 
are products of other works and to derive meaning from them is an interaction between 
the reader and the work (and intertextually with other works too) to which the author has 
no bearing.89 In such a case, in which the author is “a scriptor” and instead the reader is 
the one who engages in the creative act, the author should not have an innate property-
like right to a work.90 Ginsburg describes that “once the author descends from her 
romantic pedestal to become [...] a ‘techno postmodernist participant’, she can no longer 
be a ‘proprietor’”.91 However, neither of these opposing viewpoints fully solve the 
discord between copyright and user-generated content. Abraham Drassinower states that 
the ‘traditional’ author can also be seen as a user since “[they are] not only producers or 
creators but simultaneously users of other pre-existing materials”.92 To add, in the 
participatory culture and diffused creative processes enabled by the Web 2.0, the 
relationship between authors and users is often interdependent and, through engaging 
 
87 Rosati, 2010, p. 40. 
88 Kretschmer, Martin. “Copyright and Its Discontents.” The Oxford Handbook of Creative 
Industries, edited by Jones et al, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 458; Rosati, 2010, pp. 12-13. 
89 Barthes, Roland. “The Death of the Author.” Image-Music-Text, by Roland Barthes and 
Stephen Heath (ed.), Fontana Press, 1977; Foucault, Michel. “What Is an Author?” Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, by Michel Foucault, Donald F. 
Bouchard (ed., trans.) and Sherry Simon (trans.), Cornell University Press, 1977.  
90 Barthes, 1977, pp. 145-146. 
91 Ginsburg, 2014, p. 24. 
92 Elkin-Koren, 2017, p. 146, see Drassinower, Abraham. “Taking User Rights Seriously.” In the 
Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law, edited by Michael Geist, Irwin Law, 
2005. 
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with each other, both make original contributions to the meaning of a work and 
surrounding discourses.93  
 
Copyright ownership is also becoming increasingly centralized in the hands of 
corporations, often large-scale media conglomerates, for lengthy and perhaps even 
perpetual durations.94 Companies understand the immense value of extensive IP 
portfolios and how commodifying cultural works generates more revenue.95 This is 
exemplified by the several media mergers, such as the Disney-Fox, Viacom-CBS and 
AT&T-Time Warner in the United States just in the past recent years. The uneven 
positions and bargaining power between rightsholders and users, however, restrict 
creative expression. The most popular works are centralized in the hands of a small 
number of global media conglomerates and their affiliates, who are also increasingly 
interested in exploiting their exclusive rights in the domain of derivative works and 
subsequently seek to control any reproductions of the original work.96 Yet the works that 
rightsholders wish to control, are the ones that are the most culturally relevant for users, 
and are often specifically the ones that users seek to challenge and discuss through re-
contextualization and subversion.97 The existence of user-generated content and 
derivative works to an extent depends “on the abundance of cultural production and 
access to media objects by a large community”.98 In addition, the use of prohibitive 
license fees and the limited means for legal disputation diminishes creativity as smaller 
platforms and individual users are unable to afford these. 
 
Certain limitations and exceptions and the right to freedom of expression are often 
invoked when arguing for the legality of appropriation and user-generated content. In the 
US, the fair use doctrine has generally been the safeguard for the legal use of existing 
copyrighted materials in new works.99 The fair use doctrine allows the use of copyrighted 
 
93 Attas, 2008, p. 44; Elkin-Koren, 2017, p. 147. 
94 Boyle, 2008, p. 8.  
95 Macmillan, Fiona. “Copyright, the Creative Industries, and the Public Domain.” The Oxford 
Handbook of Creative Industries, edited by Jones et al, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 439-
442. 
96 Netanel, Neil W. Copyright’s Paradox. Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 145-146. 
97 Macmillan, 2015, pp. 441-442 
98 Sonvilla-Weiss, Stefan. "Good Artists Copy; Great Artists Steal." The Routledge Companion 
to Remix Studies, edited by Navas et al, Routledge, 2015, p. 54. 
99 Lewis, 2005, pp. 283-284. 
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works if the new work, which appropriates from the original, has a transformative 
purpose, such as, but not limited to, comment or criticism et cetera.100 The doctrine relies 
on an open-ended four-factor test which includes assessing the purpose and character of 
the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the 
appropriated portion, and the effect on potential market of or value of the original work.101 
EU copyright law, on the other hand, does not include limitations and exceptions that are 
as open-ended as the fair use doctrine. Certain exceptions, such as quotation for the 
purposes of criticism or review102 or use for the purpose of caricature, parody or 
pastiche103, may be relevant in the case of user-generated content. These exceptions have 
been optional for Member States to implement; however, the newly adopted Digital 
Single Market Directive (DSM) requires them to be made mandatory in all of the Member 
States.104 Based on the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 
these limitations and exceptions should also be construed narrowly.105 All limitations and 
exceptions must comply with the so-called three-step test, meaning they “shall only be 
applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work or other subject-matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the rightholder”. This combination has made EU copyright law significantly less 
flexible in addressing the copyright challenges raised by derivative works, appropriation 
and user-generated content. 
 
On a notional level then, copyright is a restriction on freedom of expression and 
addressing this conflict requires balancing multiple interests.106 However, the relationship 
 
100 17 U.S.C. § 107; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U. S. 569 (1994). 
101 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
102 InfoSoc Directive, Art. 5(3)(d). 
103 Ibid., Art. 5(3)(k). 
104  Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on 
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 
2001/29/EC [‘DSM Directive’], 2019 O.J. L 130/92., see preamble 70 and Art. 17(7).  
105 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, C-5/08, EU:C:2009:465; 
Hugenholtz, P. Bernt. “Flexible Copyright: Can the EU Author’s Rights Accommodate Fair 
Use?” Copyright Law in an Age of Limitations and Exceptions, edited by Ruth L. Okediji, 
Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 286. 
106 Boyle, 2008, p. 67; Dreier, Thomas. “Contracting Out of Copyright in the Information Society 
– the Impact on Freedom of Expression.” Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and 
International Analyses, edited by Griffiths el al, Oxford University Press, 2005, para. 15.16; 
Dworkin, Gerald. “Copyright, the Public Interest and Freedom of Speech.” Copyright and Free 
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of user-generated content with the scope of freedom of expression is not completely 
unproblematic. As previously discussed, the reproduction of existing copyrighted 
elements may be necessary in some cases to effectively convey certain ideas and 
meanings.107 Restricting the use of such material can then be a constraint on freedom of 
expression.108 Several justificatory theories exist for the freedom of expression right. The 
democracy theory for freedom of expression holds that certain types of speech, namely 
political expression, are more privileged to receive protection than other types of 
expression which are ‘less important’ for the public and the preservation of democracy.109 
In contrast, the non-utilitarian justification for freedom of expression attests that 
“[freedom of expression] is an integral aspect of each individual’s right to self-
development and fulfilment”.110 According to psychologist Abraham Maslow’s theory 
about motivations for human behavior and the hierarchy of needs, creativity is a key 
aspect of self-actualization in humans and the highest type of development that an 
individual can strive towards.111 A non-utilitarian justification supports “a basic 
commitment to protect all speech regardless of its ‘popularity, aesthetic, or moral 
tastefulness or mainstream acceptance’”.112  
 
Based on the democracy theory, Cassetteboy’s (an English music comedy duo) remix 
video that fuses sliced video footage and audio of the former British Prime Minister David 
Cameron’s speeches together with the instrumental version of the rap song Lose Yourself 
by Eminem (with also the inclusion of revised politically charged lyrics), is more worthy 
of protection than a retro jazz cover of the same song.113 Cassetteboy’s work would also 
 
Speech: Comparative and International Analyses, edited by Griffiths el al, Oxford University 
Press, 2005, para. 7.07; WCT & WPPT, Arts. 10. 
107 Barendt, 2005, para. 2.11; Couto, 2008, p. 164.  
108 Macmillan, 2005, para. 3.04. 
109 Ibid., paras. 3.06-3.07. 
110 Helfer, Laurence R. and Austin, Graeme W. Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Mapping 
the Global Interface. Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 225; Macmillan, 2005, para. 3.05. 
111 Maslow, Abraham H. Motivation and Personality. Harper & Row Publishers, 2nd ed., 1970, 
pp. 170-171: “The creativeness of the self-actualized man seems rather to be kin to the naïve and 
universal creativeness of unspoiled children. It seems to be more a fundamental characteristic of 
common human nature - a potentiality given to all human beings at birth.” 
112 Helfer, 2011, p. 225. 
113 Cassetteboy. “Cameron's Conference Rap.” YouTube, available at 
<youtu.be/0YBumQHPAeU> [accessed 20 Apr 2020]; Robyn Adele Anderson. “'Lose Yourself' 
(Eminem) Gypsy Jazz Cover.” YouTube, available at <youtu.be/NeB9TSu08KU> [accessed 20 
Apr 2020]. 
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likely prevail over a song mash-up combining Lose Yourself with Lin-Manuel Miranda’s 
My Shot from the musical Hamilton.114 (On a meta-level, however, Miranda has stated 
that Eminem’s image and rhyming style inspired his version of the musical’s titular 
character.115 A person familiar with both works is able to discern the similarities fairly 
easily and appreciate the mash-up’s results.) Undoubtedly, distinguishing the personal, 
artistic or commercial aspects from political ones is a task too artificial and binary.116 
Certain user-generated content will correspond more to political expression, whereas 
other content is more focused on self-expression. Some are intertwined. Inevitably then, 
under current laws some user-generated content is left outside the protection of 
‘traditional’ freedom of expression and thus is in a precarious legal position. The 
democratic theory sets a somewhat high threshold for expression that warrants protection. 
The non-utilitarian approach widens the scope of freedom of expression but does not fully 
highlight the importance of self-expression for communities and the society at large and, 
by proxy, to democratic values. After all, the personal is political and the political is 
personal. Fiona Macmillan aptly states that “a fundamental approach to cultural output 
would entail encouraging and protecting it on the basis that it has an intrinsic and non-
economic value, not only as an expression of human creativity and autonomy, but also 
[as] a means of communication within the larger cultural, social, and political domain”.117 
 
2.3. Economic incentives and the ‘value-gap’ argument 
 
The traditional understanding of the incentive theory for copyright, stating that 
remuneration for original works is necessary for the promotion of ongoing authorship and 
the creation of yet more works, also undermines the status of user-generated content. The 
incentive theory, combined with a focus on the ‘romantic author’, allocates the task of 
generating more creative works only to existing authors and ignores the contribution of 
user-generated content in promoting further creativity. In fact, user-generated content and 
 
114 Nib Oswald. “Eminem 'Lose Yourself' vs Hamilton 'My Shot'.” YouTube, available at 
<youtu.be/wxh4UZfPQ_o> [accessed 20 Apr 2020]. 
115 Malone, Chris. “Lin-Manuel Miranda explains how Common, Eminem & more inspired his 
‘Hamilton’ characters.” Billboard, 11 July 2017, available at 
<assets.billboard.com/articles/columns/hip-hop/8022853/lin-manuel-miranda-common-
eminem-inspired-hamilton> [accessed 20 Apr 2020]. 
116 Helfer, 2011, p. 225; Macmillan, 2005, para. 3.07. 
117 Macmillan, 2005, para. 3.08. 
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derivative works are often considered a threat to the commercial success or integrity of 
the existing work, thus encouraging authors and copyright owners to exercise strict 
control over the use of their works. Some creativity certainly requires economic 
remuneration as an incentive, if not to earn profit then at least to recover the costs 
associated with creating the work. However, the increase in the scope of what constitutes 
a derivative work has mostly benefitted corporate actors, rather than the authors 
themselves, and enabled rent-seeking behavior, instead of creating actual economic 
incentives.118 The level of compensation for authors and artists has been regrettably low 
even before the spread of user-generated content. Jessica Litman states that the 
architecture of the copyright system encourages delegating one’s interests to someone 
else without ensuring that the author “can take advantage of copyright’s benefits once 
they have done so”.119 Ginsburg describes that  publishers and “other exploiters to whom 
authors cede their rights” have been the substantive economic actors in the copyright 
system.120 It is questionable whether the existence of non-commercial user-generated 
content tangibly lessens the willingness of authors to create new works. It is difficult to 
assess the financial losses that an author may have suffered as a result of a UGC work 
appropriating the original. Often works may even benefit from the exposure given by 
user-derived content. The dichotomy between ‘traditional’ authors and users from the 
perspective of the creative process is somewhat artificial in the Web 2.0 era. However, 
the level of professionalism of the original creator seems to still correlate with how 
valuable a work is considered. Additionally, if the remuneration of authors is considered 
to promote further creativity and benefit the public at large, then the legal access and use 
of existing works by users can be considered a complementing and parallel method. 
Concerns about the effect of digital and online piracy are valid, but they are unrelated to 
the majority, if not all, of user-derived content out there. Instead of copyright law having 
to prohibit appropriation, it should be seen “as an institutionalized distinction between 
permissible and impermissible copying” that applies to authors and users alike.121  
 
 
118 Zimmerman, 2011, pp. 55-57. 
119 Litman, Jessica. "Fetishizing Copies." Copyright Law in an Age of Limitations and Exceptions, 
edited by Ruth L. Okediji, Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 129. 
120 Ginsburg, Jane C. "The Role of the Author in Copyright." Copyright Law in an Age of 
Limitations and Exceptions, edited by Ruth L. Okediji, Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 60. 
121 Elkin-Koren, 2017, p. 156, see Drassinower, 2005. 
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Nevertheless, the incentive argument has permeated the debate around the Web 2.0 and 
copyright. An example is the concept of the ‘value-gap’. In general, the value-gap refers 
to “an alleged mismatch between the value that some digital [UGC] platforms are 
perceived as obtaining from protected content and the revenue returned to relevant 
[rightsholders]”.122 According to rightsholders, the existing liability laws fail to hold 
online platforms sufficiently accountable for hosting copyright-infringing content and 
instead allow them to not negotiate licensing agreements with rightsholders.123 This 
value-gap argument has become integral in discussions about the role of online platforms 
in hosting user-generated content and has encouraged rightsholders to seek more effective 
digital copyright enforcement measures. The remuneration of the romantic author has 
become essential in the framing of the value-gap issue in these discussions and certainly 
raises valid concerns about the financial compensation for authors in the Web 2.0 era, but 
is somewhat ironic as the argument is most fervently promoted by the media 
conglomerates and publishers.124 The value-gap argument was paramount for the 
introduction and the adoption of Article 17 (previously referred to as Article 13) in the 
Digital Single Market Directive. The Article requires online content-sharing service 
providers (OCSSP), which store and enable users to upload and share large amounts of 
copyrighted-protected content, to ensure the unavailability on the platform of copyrighted 
content for which no authorization has been granted by the rightsholder.125 For 
rightsholders, measures like these are attractive since they “not only help facilitate 
copyright infringement actions, but also shift the costs and burdens of enforcement on to 
[service providers]”.126 Several interpretations as to the ramifications of the Article have 
 
122 Rosati, Eleonora. Copyright and the Court of Justice of the European Union. Oxford 
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been made, most commonly that it forces platforms to adopt automated ex-ante content-
filtering measures, which flag copyright-infringing content during the upload process and 
prevent its publication on the platform altogether. 
 
3. USER-GENERATED CONTENT & SHIFT TO AUTOMATED DIGITAL 
COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT MEASURES 
 
As set out in the previous chapter, user-generated content has begun to face many 
challenges and restrictions as a result of more extensive copyright enforcement in the 
digital and online spheres. For the past two decades, one of the main methods for 
rightsholders to control the use of their works on online platforms has been the notice-
and-takedown system. Notice-and-takedown procedures are linked to the concept of safe 
harbor for online service providers (OSP). An online service provider in the context of 
safe harbor provisions can refer to a range of different providers, such as the more 
‘traditional’ internet service providers that enable access to the Internet itself or the more 
recent social media and video-sharing OSPs, such as Facebook and YouTube. In 
summary, a safe harbor provision means that an online service provider will not be liable 
for storing (or linking) infringing material made available by third parties if they do not 
have knowledge of the infringement or are not aware of the facts or circumstances from 
which the infringing activity is apparent.127 When obtaining knowledge of the infringing 
activity from the rightsholder, the online service provider must act expeditiously to 
remove or disable access to the material.  
 
In the United States, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act sets the requirements for the 
notification procedure – for example, rightsholders must identify the infringing content 
and its location and attest that their notification is made in good faith.128 In addition, the 
person whose content was targeted via a notice-and-takedown procedure may contest this 
by issuing a counter notification and, amongst some other requirements, state that they 
have good faith belief that the content was removed or disabled as a result of a mistake 
 
127 DMCA, § 512(c)(1) and (d); Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular 
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ['E-Commerce Directive' or ‘ECD’], 2000 O.J. L 
178/1., Art. 14. 
128 DMCA, § 512(c)(3). 
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or a misidentification.129 In EU legislation, a safe harbor provision is found in Article 14 
of the E-Commerce Directive.130 The Directive does not define a notice-and-takedown 
procedure in detail and thus various implementation methods exist in different Member 
States. Canada, on the other hand, operates a notice-and-notice system through which an 
internet service provider or OSP, after receiving a notification from the copyright owner, 
sends a notice and information to the suspected copyright infringer about the claimed 
infringement.131 The forwarded notice cannot offer to settle the claimed infringement or 
demand compensation.132 In fact, the alleged infringer does not have to take any action 
upon receiving the notice. Thus, the system operates on a basis of discouraging copyright 
infringement via giving users relevant information and raising awareness about copyright 
infringement. However, the provider must store the infringer’s IP address for a certain 
amount of time after receiving a notification from the rightsholder.133   
    
Since their introduction, notice-and-takedown systems have progressed to something 
much more extensive than originally intended or even warranted by legislation. Notice-
and-takedown procedures were, notably, created before the explosive growth of content-
sharing online platforms and user-generated content. The systems and procedures in place 
at present on major online platforms are usually expensive and have been adopted partly 
as a result of lobbying from rightsholders.134 A qualitative study by Urban et al. identified 
three broad groups into which the notice-and-takedown practices of online service 
providers can currently be categorized.135 “DMCA Classic” online service providers 
receive notice-and-takedown notifications from rightsholders relatively infrequently and 
normally use human review to assess these notifications. On the other hand, “DMCA 
Auto” online service providers receive a high amount of notifications, which have 
increased in volume over the years, via automated systems and the review process of these 
notifications is also becoming more automated. Lastly, “DMCA Plus” online service 
providers have adopted measures beyond of what is required by legislation, such as 
 
129 DMCA, § 512(g)(3). 
130 E-Commerce Directive, Art. 14. 
131 Copyright Act 1985, section 41.25. 
132 Ibid., section. 41.25 (3). 
133 Ibid., section. 41.26. 
134 Urban, Jennifer M.; Karaganis, Joe and Schofield, Brianna L. Notice and Takedown in 
Everyday Practice. American Assembly, version 2, updated March 2017, p. 123.  
135 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
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“filtering systems, direct takedown procedures for trusted rightsholders, hash-matching 
based ‘staydown’ systems, and contractual agreements with certain rightsholders that set 
forth additional protections and obligations for both parties”.136 Urban et al. also found 
that “DMCA Auto” and “Plus” categories often overlap and that “Auto” OSPs may 
eventually turn into “Plus” OSPs.137  
 
Many of the most popular content-sharing and social media online platforms employ 
types of “DMCA Plus” measures. YouTube’s ‘Content ID’ is perhaps the most famous 
of these systems. Content ID is a fingerprinting matching technology which automatically 
detects infringing content uploaded by users. It compares existing and newly uploaded 
content to a reference file provided by the rightsholder. The scanned content may be audio 
or visual. A Content ID claim is not a takedown notification, i.e. a legal action. However, 
the rightsholder may escalate it to a formal takedown after a series of steps. Content ID 
is targeted towards more ‘expert’ users “such as movie studios, service providers and 
other publishers that have heavy reposting of copyrighted content [and] mostly 
enterprises with a large scale of copyright issues”.138 Thus, it often also targets the type 
of works and content that is most popular amongst users. If a match is found between the 
reference file and user-uploaded content, the rightsholder can choose from a range of 
‘match policies’, such as, blocking the upload (in the territory where the rightsholder 
asserts their rights), leaving the video accessible while monetizing it in order to collect ad 
revenue, muting any infringing audio, or deciding to merely track the video.  
 
A user can accept the Content ID claim or dispute it if they have the rights to use the 
copyright-protected content or believe their upload has been misidentified. If a user 
disputes, the match policy is temporarily halted. The rightsholder, in a certain time frame, 
can respond either by releasing the claim (an inaction to respond to a claim would result 
in the same outcome) or by issuing a takedown notification. A takedown notification must 
still be done manually by the rightsholder. The rightsholder can also always opt to file a 
 
136 Urban et al, 2017, p. 2. 
137 Ibid., p. 2. 
138 YouTube. "YouTube Copyright Management Product Suite." Third meeting of the Stakeholder 
Dialogue on Art 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, 25 Nov 2019, 
European Commission, Brussels, Belgium. Presentation and recording available at  
<ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/third-meeting-stakeholder-dialogue-art-17-
directive-copyright-digital-single-market> [accessed 30 Nov 2019]. 
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takedown claim immediately, bypassing the Content ID steps. In a notice-and-takedown 
situation, similarly, the user can accept the takedown request, ask for it to be retracted or 
file a formal counter notification. Thus, user-generated content in such a case can be 
blocked via two routes: automatically via a Content ID claim or through a takedown 
notification by the rightsholder (eventually or immediately).139 In a fairly recent US case 
concerning user-derived content, the Ninth Circuit held that the rightsholder must 
consider, at least subjectively, whether use of the copyrighted work constitutes fair use 
before issuing a takedown notification.140 The plaintiff had uploaded on YouTube a 29-
second video of her children dancing to singer-songwriter Prince’s song Let’s Go 
Crazy.141  
 
The traditional economic policy arguments promoted by rightsholders in favor of 
blocking user-generated content focus on the notion that unlicensed use of content 
deprives rightsholders of potential revenue, and that user-generated content unfairly 
competes with or even substitutes the original work in its market, or that it might cause 
unwanted reputational damage which will be reflected in monetary gains.142 However, an 
empirical study by Erickson and Kretschmer investigating the factors that motivate 
takedowns of user-generated content by rightsholders, found that “policy concerns 
frequently raised by rightsholders are not associated with statistically significant patterns 
of action (emphasis added)”.143 For example, videos which were more popular or had a 
higher production value had a lower risk of being taken down, thus undermining the 
commercial substitution argument.144 Instead, amateur content which represents the 
majority of user-generated content was more likely to be removed. In addition, parody 
uploads which targeted the underlying copyright-protected work had a smaller chance of 
being blocked and the severity of the parody in fact reduced the risk of a takedown, which 
casts doubt on rightsholders’ concerns about reputational damage.145 Erickson and 
 
139 Erickson, Kristofer and Kretschmer, Martin. "This Video is Unavailable": Analyzing 
Copyright Takedown of User-Generated Content on YouTube." Journal of Intellectual Property, 
Information Technology and E-Commerce Law, vol. 9(1), 2018, p. 16. 
140 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2015), p. 1133. 
141 Stephanie Lenz. “Let’s Go Crazy” #1.” YouTube, available at <youtu.be/N1KfJHFWlhQ> 
[accessed 15 Mar 2020]. 
142 Erickson et al, 2018, paras. 32-33. 
143 Ibid., p. 75. 
144 Ibid., paras. 51, 59-60. 
145 Ibid., para. 60. 
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Kretschmer suggest that the possibility for rightsholders to monetize or track the use of 
their copyright-protected material makes it more likely that rightsholders allow high-
quality and popular uploads to remain on the platform. However, the takedown rate for 
more amateur-level content remains disproportionate. The study concludes that 
rightsholders “make complex choices that are assisted by automatic detection 
mechanisms, with little concern for the artistic integrity of the creative works they 
represent”.146 It is highly problematic that rightsholders themselves, via Content ID and 
other similar systems, have become the arbiters of whether certain content constitutes 
infringing and whether it can remain online. 
 
Several other concerns pertain to automated takedown procedures. Another study by 
Urban et al. found that out of the 1,800 takedown requests investigated (from Google 
Web Search), a third raised concerns about their validity and one in twenty-five had 
misidentified the content entirely.147 In addition, takedown requests made in bad faith 
remain a problem on many platforms and users utilize formal counter-notification 
processes quite rarely, possibly to avoid the threat of legal action.148 Recommendations 
by academics generally highlight that these type of automated content-filtering systems 
should include mechanisms for human review.149 Significantly, neither the DMCA nor 
the E-Commerce Directive require online service providers to implement automated 
takedown measures.150 In fact, Article 15 of ECD explicitly states that Member States 
cannot impose a general obligation on OSPs to monitor content.151 Nevertheless, as Urban 
et al. have described, the most popular online platforms have decided to implement 
“Auto” and “Plus” takedown measures.  
 
Returning to the examples discussed in Chapter 2 about the various remix works 
incorporating Eminem’s song, Lose Yourself is in fact licensed to YouTube by Universal 
 
146 Erickson et al, 2018, para. 64 
147 Urban et al, 2017, p. 116. 
148 Ibid., pp. 117-119. 
149 Ibid., p. 135; Quintais, João; Frosio, Giancarlo; Gompel, Stef van; Hugenholtz, P. Bernt; 
Husovec, Martin; Jütte, Bernd Justin and Senftleben, Martin. “Safeguarding User Freedoms in 
Implementing Article 17 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: 
Recommendations from European Academics.”, November 2019, pp. 4-5. 
150 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc, 665 F. Supp. 2d., at 1111-12. 
151 This has also been affirmed in case-law: Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM, C-70/10, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:771, para. 55. 
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Music Group. Similarly, My Shot has been licensed by Warner Music Group. This allows 
users to incorporate the songs in their content and even monetize the upload, which also 
accrues royalties for the rightsholders (though, the rightsholder can choose to monetize 
the content at any point irrespective of the user’s actions). Users would be in a more 
uncertain position if the songs had not been licensed to the platform, and this continues 
to be the case for countless of songs and other copyrighted works. The lack of licensing 
on online platforms is usually more prevalent in the field of non-musical (audio)visual 
works.152 There is also the question of whether rightsholders should be able to extend 
their copyright control and remuneration rights to essentially non-commercial and non-
profit uses of their works on these platforms. In the discussed cases, this is made more 
complicated due to the jazz cover of Lose Yourself being performed evidently by a 
professional singer who, while not receiving profit from the video, operates a 
merchandise store and a patronage-type subscription service for her fans. Even the creator 
of the Eminem/Miranda remix, is an individual clearly talented in their trade, though this 
still does not necessarily indicate that the mash-up would not constitute a non-commercial 
user-derived work. 
 
3.1. Article 17 and the EU copyright reform  
 
A key development in the European Union with regards to copyright law has been the 
adoption of the Digital Single Market Directive in 2019, with the transposition deadline 
for the Directive being in 2021. One of the Directive’s main aims is to “achieve a well-
functioning and fair marketplace for copyright” as stated in Recital 3. To this end, Article 
17 on the use of protected content by online content-sharing service providers was one of 
the key provisions adopted. The provision itself, its legislative process and (on-going) 
implementation processes have been controversial. To follow, is a summary of the 
contents of Article 17.  
 
 
152 Keller, Paul. “Article 17 stakeholder dialogue (day 2): Filters, not licenses!” 11 Nov 2019, 
available at <communia-association.org/2019/11/11/article-17-stakeholder-dialogue-day-2-
filters-not-licenses/> [accessed 3 Dec 2019]; Keller, Paul. “Article 17 stakeholder dialogue (day 
4): it’s all about transparency.” 2 Jan 2020, available at <communia-
association.org/2020/01/02/article-17-stakeholder-dialogue-day-4-transparency/> [accessed 2 
Jan 2020]. 
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According to the Article, online content-sharing service providers (OCSSP) must obtain 
authorization from rightsholders, for example via licensing, for storing and giving access 
to copyright-protected works or other protected subject matter uploaded by users.153 In 
Art. 2(6) of the Directive, OCCSPs are defined as “[providers of information society 
services that] store and give the public access to a large amount of copyright-protected 
works or other protected subject matter uploaded by its users, which [the provider] 
organises and promotes for profit-making purposes”. For example, services like 
YouTube or Facebook can be categorized as OCSSPs. According to Art. 17(2), the 
authorization obtained by an OCSSP also covers acts of users “when they are acting on a 
commercial basis or where [the user’s] activity does not generate significant revenues”. 
Thus, OCSSPs in the scope of Article 17 can no longer rely on the safe harbor provision 
in Article 14 ECD.154 
 
Most controversially, in the case of an OCSSP not having an authorization from the 
rightsholder, the provider is liable for storing and giving the public access to protected 
content, unless they have: 
 
“(a) made best efforts to obtain an authorisation, and  
(b) made, in accordance with high industry standards of professional diligence, 
best efforts to ensure the unavailability of specific works and other subject 
matter for which the rightholders have provided the service providers with the 
relevant and necessary information; and in any event  
(c) acted expeditiously, upon receiving a sufficiently substantiated notice from the 
rightholders, to disable access to, or to remove from their websites, the notified 
works or other subject matter, and made best efforts to prevent their future 
uploads in accordance with point (b) (emphasis added)”.155  
 
The concept of “best efforts” has not been defined and likely creates uncertainties for 
platforms with regards to the application of Article 17. Certain aspects, such as the type, 
the size and the audience of the service and the availability of suitable and effective means 
 
153 DSM Directive, Art 17(1). 
154 Ibid., Art. 17(3). 
155 Ibid., Art 17(4). 
  
31 
 
and their cost, are considered when assessing “best efforts”.156 Some exceptions are made 
for ‘start-up’ OCSSPs, though they are limited in duration.157 What has created concern 
amongst stakeholders, interests groups and the public has been that in order to realistically 
ensure the unavailability of specific works and to prevent any future uploads, near all 
OCSSPs would need to implement extensive and fully automated content-filtering 
systems that monitor the content being uploaded. As already mentioned, some providers 
may already employ their own automated monitoring systems (such as YouTube with 
Content ID) and other smaller platforms may utilize software provided by companies that 
specialize in content-detection (which has initially been created with the intention of 
curbing online piracy, not user-generated content in itself). However, these automated 
systems that detect the use of copyright-protected works in user uploads are unable to 
deduce the context in which the work is being used.158 Thus, in the case that automated 
content-monitoring systems become the norm, this could result in over-blocking of user-
generated content that is covered by an exception or limitation or is otherwise legal. 
 
However, the Directive also states that OCSSPs must not prevent “the availability of 
works or other subject matter uploaded by users, which do not infringe copyright and 
related rights, including where such works or other subject matter are covered by an 
exception or limitation”, and the provisions regarding quotation, criticism, review and use 
for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche are made mandatory in Union law.159 
The Directive states that the application of Article 17 should not lead to a general 
monitoring obligation.160 However, it is unclear how this could be averted if OCSSPs are 
still required to prevent the availability of certain works and any future uploads of them. 
Notably, for the users, OCSSPs must put in place complaint and redress mechanisms in 
the event of disputes about the blocking of content.161 The Article also states that 
 
156 DSM Directive, Art 17(5). 
157 Ibid., Art 17(6). 
158 Keller, Paul. “Article 17 stakeholder dialogue (day 3): Filters do not meet the requirements of 
the directive.” 3 Dec 2019, available at <communia-association.org/2019/12/03/article-17-
stakeholder-dialogue-day-3-filters-not-meet-requirements-directive/> [accessed 3 Dec 2019]; 
Keller, Paul. “Article 17 stakeholder dialogue (day 4): it’s all about transparency.” 2 Jan 2020, 
available at <communia-association.org/2020/01/02/article-17-stakeholder-dialogue-day-4-
transparency/> [accessed 2 Jan 2020] 
159 DSM Directive, Art. 17(7).  
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complaints made by users through such mechanisms must be subject to human review. 
Users should have access to both out-of-court redress mechanisms or a judicial authority 
to assert the use of an exception or limitation. Users must also be informed about the 
exceptions and limitations to copyright provided for in Union law in the terms and 
conditions of the OCCSP’s service. 
 
Several aspects concerning the interpretation and the implementation of Article 17 remain 
highly controversial. On one hand, the provision relates to licensing, and on the other 
hand, it also pertains to controlling user-uploaded content. In theory, non-commercial 
user-generated content that utilizes a copyright-protected work would be covered by the 
authorization obtained by the OCSSP, and in the case of no authorization, users may be 
able to rely on certain limitations and exceptions. The focus on licensing in Article 17 is 
also slightly misleading. For example, a user-uploaded parody of a copyright-protected 
work that fulfills the threshold for parody would evidently not need to rely on a license 
since it constitutes a new work. In such a case, the content may even be commercial. 
However, user-generated content which falls outside the traditional parameters of the 
existing limitations and exceptions or does not meet the high threshold for protected 
expression under a fundamental rights perspective is still left in an uncertain position.  
 
To demonstrate this further, this could be the case for non-critical homage-type works 
(notably, the line between homage and parody can be difficult to separate) or fan art (i.e. 
artistic works created by fans utilizing elements from another, often copyright-protected, 
work). Some of these types of works may well reach the threshold of parody, commentary 
or criticism. However, the majority of homage or fan works produced and shared by users 
are non-commercial in nature and shared for purposes of community participation, 
discussion and general enjoyment.162 As discussed in the previous chapters, some users 
may decide to commercialize such works, for example, via online marketplaces or 
patronage-type online platforms. Clearly, this type of activity corresponds to copyright 
infringement under current copyright laws. If one were to make these types of activities 
explicitly legal, the solutions would likely lie in other methods, such as providing more 
accessible licensing options or perhaps even compulsory licensing. YouTube’s Content 
 
162 Santo, Avi. "Fans and Merchandise". The Routledge Companion to Media Fandom, edited by 
Click et al, Routledge, 2017, pp. 77-79. 
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ID operates as almost a quasi-compulsory licensing system where the rightsholder can 
receive royalties by monetizing the content.  
 
However, for the ‘traditional’ non-commercial user-generated content, which still 
amounts to the majority of UGC out there, a specific or a broadly interpreted open-ended 
exception would provide a firmer legal status. It also sends an affirmative and normative 
message that users’ expression and participatory activities are protected and valued in 
society. Rightsholders are often aware of the potential that user-derived content and 
online communities bring to the success of a work. Users wishing to engage in various 
creative processes in a non-commercial manner should not have to rely on the whim of 
rightsholders or the existence of a correct license. Nor should exclusive rights, 
particularly in the domain of derivative works, be taken so far that every possible use 
would demand a license. To this end, the existence of suitable limitations and exceptions 
is vital. 
 
4. LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS – US, CANADA & THE EU 
 
The so-called ‘three-step test’ has relevance to the balancing of interests between 
rightsholders and users. The test was first introduced in the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and has since been included, in various updated 
forms, in other international law instruments, such as the TRIPS Agreement and the 
WIPO Internet Treaties.163 The aim of the test is to limit the exceptions and limitations 
made to exclusive rights under national copyright laws. It has been drafted in an open-
ended manner in order for it to apply to any exceptions or limitations adopted at a future 
time. In general, the three-step test holds that limitations and exceptions to exclusive 
rights must be confined to:  
1. Certain special cases; 
2. which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work; and 
3. do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightsholder.  
Any exceptions or limitations to copyright in national legislation need to comply with the 
three-step test, if the country is signatory to these treaties. Some nations and regional 
jurisdictions, such as the EU, have chosen to incorporate the three-step test into their own 
 
163 Berne Convention, Art. 9(2); TRIPS, Art. 13; WCT, Art. 10; WPPT, Art. 16.  
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legislation. Even if open-ended, some general conclusions can be made about the features 
of the three-step test. The first step indicates that a limitation or exception should be 
definite in scope and reach. The second step requires assessing “the likely economic 
impact of the exception on the market of the original with the significance of the values 
upon which the exception is based”.164 And lastly, even in the case where an exception is 
warranted, the non-economic interests of the rightsholders “must still be considered and 
weighed fairly to ensure that the prejudice caused is not disproportionate”.165 
 
4.1. The United States – fair use 
 
The copyright law of the United States is based on an incentive theory as opposed to a 
natural right theory which endorses an innate property-like right to one’s intellectual and 
creative works. The so-called Copyright Clause of the US Constitution states that the 
Congress “shall have power… To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Rights to their 
respective Writing and Discoveries”.166 US copyright law includes a lengthy list of 
specific limitations and exceptions, but the open-ended fair use defense is most often 
invoked in relation to user-generated content. The doctrine has its roots in US case-law. 
In Folsom v. Marsh, the Court assessed whether it was justifiable to use copyrighted 
material, in this case verbatim personal letters, in a book. Justice Story identified four key 
factors for assessing whether a use might be ‘fair’, namely, that one must “look to the 
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, 
and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or 
supersede the objects, of the original work”.167 Fair use was eventually incorporated as a 
statutory exception in 1976. The provision includes a non-exhaustive list of purposes for 
uses and sets out four factors employed in assessing fairness of the use: 
 
“[§ 107] Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of 
a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such 
 
164 Jacques, Sabine. The Parody Exception in Copyright Law. Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 
52. 
165Ibid., p. 54. 
166 United States Constitution, 17 September 1787, Article I, section 8, clause 8.  
167 Folsom. v. Marsh 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841), p. 348. 
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as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In 
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use 
the factors to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is 
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work (emphasis added).”168  
 
4.1.1. US case-law 
 
Major aspects of the fair use doctrine have been developed in case-law and several cases 
provide parallels to the characteristics of user-derived content. The doctrine’s listed 
fairness factors and open-ended format require by nature the courts to assess between the 
interests of users and rightsholders. The judiciary has recognized the importance of 
appropriation in making effective references and allusions that are a key component of 
user-derived content. In a landmark parody and fair use case Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music Inc., the Supreme Court defined parody as “the use of some elements of a prior 
author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that author’s 
work”.169 A rap group 2 Live Crew had created a commercial parody song based on Roy 
Orbison’s song Oh, Pretty Woman. The effectiveness of the humor or comment in a 
parody depends on the “recognizable allusion to its object through distorted imitation… 
its art lies in the tension between a known original and its parodic twin… and it must be 
able to ‘conjure up’ at least enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit 
recognizable (emphasis added)”.170 Thus, the amount borrowed from the original must be 
assessed in light of the purpose of the use. In Suntrust, the Eleventh Circuit stated that a 
parody does not necessarily need to be humorous but can also “comment upon or criticize 
 
168 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (for the general revision of copyright 
law, title 17 of the United States Code, and for other purposes), October 19, 1976, § 107. 
169 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), p. 580. 
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a prior work by appropriating elements”.171 The case concerned a critical and 
transformative re-telling of the novel Gone with the Wind from the perspective of a slave. 
Again, however, it is likely that only the more explicitly humorous or critical UGC works, 
which at least partly target the original, would be able to effectively rely on the parody, 
criticism or comment purposes under fair use.  
 
In Campbell, the Supreme Court also emphasized that fair use allows courts “to avoid 
rigid application of the copyright statute, when, on occasion, it would stifle the very 
creativity which that law is designed to foster”.172 The Court built upon previous case-
law in assessing whether the new work was “transformative”. A work that appropriates 
from a copyrighted work but “adds something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning or message” can be considered 
as transformative.173 The main goal of the Copyright Clause – to promote science and the 
arts – is then furthered by the creation of transformative works.174 While the four factors 
serve an important role in assessing whether a use is fair, many have argued that 
transformativeness has become the key criteria.175 In general, considerations of 
transformativeness are especially relevant to user-derived works, particularly ones that 
are not able to rely on specific purposes. When a new work is highly transformative, the 
significance of other factors, including whether the work was of commercial nature, are 
less relevant. Parody is also less likely to be a market substitute since it usually serves a 
different market function to the original work.176 Similarly in Suntrust, the Court 
concluded that there was not enough evidence to support the notion that the parody novel 
could harm the existing or potential derivative markets of Gone with the Wind, and that 
market substitution of the original was unlikely. In order to meaningfully understand a 
critical parody, one needs to have a certain familiarity with the original work. For certain 
parodies or critiques, such as the novel in Suntrust, the unrelated market might be easy to 
identify. With regards to user-derived content that serves to extend or add something to 
the general discourse around a certain work, this task is harder. 
 
 
171 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001), pp. 1268-1269. 
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An impact on the market of the original is, however, not sufficient in itself to establish 
that a use is not fair.177 All of the four factors are important in assessing fair use, but the 
Supreme Court has stated that the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value 
of the copyrighted work is “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use”.178 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Betamax case established that the home-taping of film and 
television programs for private use constitutes fair use. More significantly, as stated by 
the District Court, the fact that Universal could not demonstrate that the use would have 
a meaningful likelihood of harming its market, and that the harm was speculative in itself, 
weighed in favor of fair use.179 The Supreme Court explicitly reiterated that a use “that 
has no demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted 
work need not be prohibited in order to protect the author’s incentive to create… the 
prohibition of such noncommercial uses would merely inhibit access to ideas without any 
countervailing benefit (emphasis added)”.180 The rightsholder must show “the 
[prevalence of evidence] that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists… [and] 
if the [intended use] is for a non-commercial purpose the likelihood must be 
demonstrated”.181 However, the emphasis on ‘value-gaps’ and the extension of 
rightsholder control into the online domain through automated digital copyright 
enforcement mechanisms demonstrate that the burden has not shifted. At the outset, even 
non-commercial user-generated content is (incorrectly) presumed to have a negative 
economic impact on the original. 
 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that it is not for the judiciary to assess the artistic 
merits of works “outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits”.182 In Walt Disney 
Productions v. Air Pirates, the Ninth Circuit found that the substantiality of copying and 
its fairness need to be evaluated based on how much of “[the taking] was necessary to 
recall or conjure up the original”, keeping in mind the purpose of the use.183 The amount 
borrowed from a copyrighted work does not necessarily have to be substantial 
quantitatively – if the appropriated part qualitatively constitutes ‘the heart’ of the work 
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180 Ibid., pp. 450- 451. 
181 Ibid., pp. 451. 
182 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. 188 U.S. 239 (1903), p. 251. 
183 Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.1978) 
  
38 
 
then that could be enough for not establishing fair use.184 With regards to these aspects, 
fair use cases about appropriation art provide some useful parallels in relation to user-
derived content. Two such cases concern the contemporary artist Jeff Koons. Koons is 
known for appropriating elements from existing works and objects, often concerning pop 
culture and consumer advertising, and incorporating these into his own works.  
 
In Rogers v. Koons, Koons had created a sculpture based on a photograph that depicted a 
man and a woman holding a litter of puppies in their arms.185 The photograph was used 
widely in tourist-type postcards. Koons’ sculpture copied the appearance of the 
photograph in its totality and the work was part of his art series depicting everyday objects 
in a new context. The purpose of Koons’ sculpture may have been “a satirical critique of 
[the] materialistic society” based on the photograph, but according to the Court this was 
too difficult to discern from the use. Koons’ work was being exhibited in shows and 
licensed for various for-profit uses which also weighed heavily against fair use. The 
likelihood of future harm to the original’s market could be presumed since the use was 
intended for commercial gain. Courts may also analyze the motive and intent behind the 
purpose and character of the use. Koons had removed the copyright notice from the 
original work once sending it to his artisans which suggested that the appropriation had 
been done in bad faith. Unsurprisingly, the Second Circuit affirmed that Koons’ use of 
the copyrighted work did not constitute fair use.  
 
In Blanch v. Koons, Koons’ collage painting, which depicted several women’s feet 
dangling over images of confections with a landscape scenery in the background, 
incorporated parts of Blanch’s fashion photograph showing a woman’s legs and feet with 
sandals.186 The Court stated that Koon’s purpose for using the original work was to 
comment on “the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media” and was thus highly 
different from Blanch’s aim to show “some sort of erotic sense” in her photograph.187 
Koons himself stated that “by using an existing image, [he ensured] a certain authenticity 
or veracity that enhances [his] commentary… it is the difference between quoting and 
paraphrasing…and ensure that the viewer will understand what [he] is referring to 
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(emphasis added)”.188  Concerning the second factor, the scope of fair use for fictional or 
unpublished works is usually narrower compared to works that are factual or published. 
With regards to this factor, the Court considered Koons’ use to not “exploit creative 
virtues [of the original work]”, but rather the intention was to comment on the original’s 
meaning in a transformative manner.189 Subsequently, also the amount and substantiality 
of the borrowing was proportional to the purpose of the use. Blanch admitted that Koons’ 
use of her work had not harmed the potential market or value for it. In fact, she had never 
licensed the photograph, and thus Koons’ work could not be considered to have a negative 
economic impact on the original. The emphasis given by the courts to the motivations and 
intent behind the use bodes well for user-generated content. Clearly, the majority of UGC 
works are not done for bad faith purposes (as Koons had done in Rogers) and the reasons 
behind the use of the original work are often very similar to the ones Koons expressed in 
Blanch – to enhance the meaning conveyed in the content. Similarly, non-commercial 
user-generated content incorporating works which have not been commercially exploited 
may easily rely on fair use. However, as discussed previously, user-derived content often 
references prominent and well-known works that have entered into common cultural 
language and such works are being increasingly exploited by rightsholders in various 
existing and potential markets. 
 
Another similar case concerns the appropriation artist Richard Prince who used the 
photographer Patrick Cariou’s works in a series of collages that were exhibited publicly 
in a gallery. The Second Circuit heavily criticized the lower court’s narrow approach to 
transformativeness and responded that fair use “imposes no requirement that a work 
[comments] on the original or its author in order to be considered transformative, and a 
secondary work may constitute fair use even if it serves some purpose other than those 
identified in [its] preamble”.190 The Court stated that Prince’s works “manifested an 
entirely different aesthetic” when compared with Cariou’s original photographs. Cariou’s 
works were “serene” and the artist himself had described them as “extreme classical 
photography [and] portraiture”, whereas Prince’s appropriative works were “hectic and 
provocative”.191 The majority of Cariou’s collages were found to constitute 
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transformative fair use. The Court remanded the investigation of fair use to the District 
Court concerning Prince’s collages with more minimal alterations. The parties eventually 
settled.  
 
The approach in Cariou was later criticized in Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, namely for 
its overemphasis on transformativeness which could “not only [replace] the list in § 107 
but also [override] 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), which protects derivative works”.192 According to 
the Seventh Circuit, Cariou fails to explain “how every ‘transformative use’ can be ‘fair 
use’ without extinguishing the author’s rights under § 106(2)”.193 Instead, the Court 
preferred focusing on the fourth factor and whether the use constitutes “a complement to 
the protected work [which is allowed] rather than a substitute for it [which is 
prohibited]”.194 User-generated content would undoubtedly benefit from a wide 
interpretation of transformativeness, but the Court’s description of the new work 
complementing the original is, in fact, what most user-derived works seek to do in any 
case. 
 
The case-law regarding fair use tends to emphasize analysis of transformativeness of the 
use and the fourth factor regarding the effect of the use on the potential market or value 
of the original work. As such, fair use analysis addresses the interests that users have in 
creating and sharing user-derived expressions and the economic interests of the 
rightsholders. The US courts have also shown a general acceptance towards appropriation 
being an important tool in the formation of new expressions. For user-generated content, 
the concept of transformativeness is essential. However, as Rogers and Kienitz 
demonstrate, it is unclear just how far the scope of transformativeness can be extended, 
particularly in cases concerning appropriation and substantial copying. Based on the case-
law, a certain level of tangible difference to the original expression or a distinctly different 
purpose behind the use of the expression compared to the original are likely required. The 
analysis about the effect of the use is not immediately prejudiced against user-generated 
content, as can be discerned from Suntrust and Betamax. The extension of derivative work 
rights and the current emphasis on value-gaps from rightsholders can, however, 
undermine this aspect. 
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4.1.2. Assessing the fair use provision 
 
The compliance of the fair use doctrine under the three-step test is somewhat 
controversial. The provision does not include an exhaustive list of purposes for uses 
which is considered by some to mean that fair use does not meet the requirement of an 
exception having to apply only to “certain special cases”. Others have stated that the fair 
use case-law can be divided into clusters that show “predictable patterns” of whether a 
certain use is fair, and thus the scope of fair use can effectively be narrowed to various 
specific purposes.195 The fair use test meets the second step of the three-step test by 
assessing the economic interests of rightsholders via the fourth factor. Compliance with 
the third step is less clear, but at the very least certain non-economic concerns may be 
linked to the value of the work. The fair use doctrine may raise several questions about 
its compliance with the three-step test, but its legality has so far been unchallenged under 
international law. 
 
Freedom of expression concerns are also relevant to the application of fair use. According 
to the First Amendment of the US Constitution, the Congress cannot make laws that 
curtail freedom of speech. First Amendment considerations have often been raised in 
infringement cases concerning parody or criticism or matters of public interest.196 The 
First Amendment can be considered to generally oppose the copyright monopoly.197 On 
the other hand, there are also claims that the Copyright Clause itself was created as a tool 
to promote freedom of speech values.198 The idea-expression dichotomy has traditionally 
been seen as a way to separate First Amendment and copyright concerns.199 However, as 
discussed in previous chapters, the borrowing of certain expressions is necessary to 
convey specific meanings and the US courts have discussed this in their case-law, for 
example in Campbell. There may be grounds in current US case-law for fair use to be 
considered as more of a right, rather than a mere defense. In Lenz, mentioned in Chapter 
3, the Ninth Circuit argued that labeling fair use “as an affirmative defense that excuses 
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conduct is a misnomer” and referred to another case which stated that “it is logical to 
view fair use as a right”.200 The interpretation of fair use as a right, rather than as a mere 
legal defense, would seem more suitable in promoting the goals embedded in the 
Copyright Clause.201  
 
On the face of it, the fair use doctrine is a flexible and open-ended exception which tries 
to balance the interest of rightsholders and users. Theoretically, it should also be open to 
accept the more social, community and self-expression related purposes, which 
characterize user-generated content, as suitable under fair use. The open-endedness of fair 
use is also a weakness. The ambiguous nature of the doctrine can be hurdle for 
rightsholders, but even more so for users. Authors, and more commonly copyright 
owners, continue to be in a much better bargaining position with more resources and 
knowledge of the legal landscape. Reliance on fair use continues to be vital for user-
generated content, but more explicit ratios or even obiter dicta about the applicability of 
fair use regarding user-derived works are needed. In combination with the fluctuating 
case-law, the generally ex post determination of fair use after costly litigation is 
problematic and constitutes a significant deterrent for most users. 
 
4.2. Canada 
 
Canadian copyright law is particularly interesting from the perspective of user-generated 
content. After a long legislative process, Canada amended its fair dealing provision to 
include three additional purposes – parody, satire and education – and introduced a 
specific exception for non-commercial user-generated content.202 Both fair dealing and 
the statutory exception for non-commercial UGC, in combination with recent Canadian 
copyright case-law, have significant bearings on the balancing of rightsholders’ and 
users’ interests.  
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British Commonwealth countries, such as Canada, often have a tradition of fair dealing. 
There are two stages to a fair dealing analysis.203 Firstly, it is necessary to consider 
whether the use of a work, i.e. the ‘dealing’, falls under a purpose listed in the provision, 
and secondly, whether the use is fair. There are specific criteria for assessing fairness. In 
Canada, these have developed in case-law and fairness “is a question of fact and depends 
on the facts of each case”.204 Thus, fair dealing is generally considered to differ from fair 
use in the respect that instead of being fully open-ended, it includes specific and a 
supposedly exhaustive list of purposes for which fair dealing is allowed. Fair use 
incorporates only the second-stage analysis of fairness. Since 2012, the Canadian 
Copyright Act has included the fair dealing purposes of parody, satire and education: 
 
“[Section 29] Fair dealing for the purpose of research, private study, education, 
parody or satire does not infringe copyright.” 
 
In addition, fair dealing for the purposes of criticism or review and news reporting 
(sections 29.1 and 29.2 of the Canadian Copyright Act, respectively) does not infringe 
copyright if the following are mentioned:  
 
“(a) the source; and 
 (b) if given in the source, the name of the 
(i) author, in the case of a work, 
(ii) performer, in the case of a performer’s performance, 
(iii) maker, in the case of a sound recording, or 
(iv) broadcaster, in the case of a communication signal.” 
 
The above conditions are not required for the purposes of research, private study, 
education, parody or satire. 
 
The Canadian exception for non-commercial user-generated content concerns specifically 
user-derived content: 
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 “[Section 29.21 (1)] It is not an infringement of copyright for an individual to 
use an existing work or other subject-matter or copy of one, which has been 
published or otherwise made available to the public, in the creation of a new 
work or other subject-matter in which copyright subsists and for the individual 
— or, with the individual’s authorization, a member of their household — to use 
the new work or other subject-matter or to authorize an intermediary to 
disseminate it, if 
(a) the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, the new work or other 
subject-matter is done solely for non-commercial purposes; 
(b) the source — and, if given in the source, the name of the author, 
performer, maker or broadcaster — of the existing work or other subject-
matter or copy of it are mentioned, if it is reasonable in the circumstances 
to do so; 
(c) the individual had reasonable grounds to believe that the existing 
work or other subject-matter or copy of it, as the case may be, was not 
infringing copyright; and 
(d) the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, the new work or other 
subject-matter does not have a substantial adverse effect, financial or 
otherwise, on the exploitation or potential exploitation of the existing work 
or other subject-matter — or copy of it — or on an existing or potential 
market for it, including that the new work or other subject-matter is not a 
substitute for the existing one (emphasis added).”205 
 
‘Use’ in the context of the section refers to “[doing] anything that by [the Act] the owner 
of the copyright has the sole right to do, other than the right to authorize anything” and 
‘an intermediary’ refers to “a person or entity who regularly provides space or means for 
works or other subject-matter to be enjoyed by the public”.206 
 
4.2.1. Canadian case-law 
 
While the statutory changes to Canadian copyright law have been significant in expanding 
the list of available limitations and exceptions, the development of Canadian case-law has 
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been equally important. The Canadian fair dealing provision used to be interpreted 
narrowly by the courts until the early 2000s. In a 1990 case, Bishop v. Stevens, the 
Canadian Supreme Court emphasized that the goal of the Copyright Act, originally 
deriving from UK law, was to “[benefit] authors of all kinds, whether the works were 
literary, dramatic or musical”.207 The narrow interpretation was reiterated in Michelin 
which concerned the use of the Michelin man logo in a union leaflet during a labor 
dispute.208 According the union, the use of the logo was parodic and would subsequently 
qualify under the criticism purpose in fair dealing. At the time, parody was not included 
in the provision. The Court stated that parody is not a form of criticism under the fair 
dealing provision, which should be interpreted narrowly, and that parody is not 
synonymous with criticism. The Federal Court differentiated Canadian fair dealing from 
the US-based fair use doctrine and its case-law, particularly Campbell, based on 
differences in the legal regimes.209 Instead, the Court discussed parody within “the 
ordinary meaning of the term” and consulted a general dictionary definition, stating that 
parody is “a musical, literary or other composition that mimics the style of another 
composer, author, etc. in a humorous or satirical way”.210  
 
In 2002, the Canadian Supreme Court shifted the interpretation of the Copyright Act as it 
was set out in Bishop. In Théberge, the Court stated that the Copyright Act of 1985 
balances “between promoting the public interests in the encouragement and dissemination 
of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator… [and] the 
proper balance among these and other public policy objective lies not only in recognizing 
the creator’s rights but in giving due weight to their limited nature (emphasis added)”.211 
The Court also recognized that excessive control by rightsholders can “unduly limit the 
ability of the public domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in the long-
term interests of society as a whole, or create practical obstacles to proper utilization”.212 
 
Two years later the Canadian Supreme Court gave a landmark copyright decision in CCH 
Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada. Several legal publishers claimed that the 
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Law Society was liable for copyright infringement by reproducing copies of cases and 
other legal materials to its members, the judiciary and researchers via on request and self-
service photocopy services. The Supreme Court, however, held that the Law Society did 
not infringe copyright, that the use was fair and fell under the fair dealing purpose of 
research. According to the Court, fair dealing should be understood “as an integral part 
of the [Copyright Act 1985]” rather than as a mere defense.213 Significantly, the Court 
elevated the status of exceptions to copyright, including fair dealing, to a user’s right. In 
order to maintain the proper balance between the rights of authors and copyright owners 
and the rights of users, exceptions must not be interpreted narrowly. The Court described 
that ‘research’ “must be given a large and liberal interpretation in order to ensure that 
users’ rights are not unduly constrained… [and that] research is not limited to non-
commercial or private contexts”.214  
 
Whilst the Canadian Copyright Act does not define “fair”, the Court endorsed in CCH a 
framework of six different factors, which bear similarities to the factors under US fair 
use, that should be used to assess whether a dealing constitutes fair: 1) the purpose of the 
dealing;  2) the character of the dealing; 3) the amount of the dealing; 4) alternatives to 
the dealing; 5) the nature of the work; and 6) the effect of the dealing on the work.  
 
According to the first factor, the use must fall under one of the listed purposes in the fair 
dealing provision. However, the purposes should be interpreted in a broad manner in order 
to not unduly restrict users’ rights. Courts can also assess the user’s motive in using the 
copyrighted work. Certain uses are generally less fair than others, for example 
commercial uses warrant a higher scrutiny than non-commercial ones. For the character 
of the dealing, it is relevant to consider how widely the work has been distributed as part 
of the use and what customs exist in certain trades and industries.215 The third factor 
assesses the quantity being copied from the work; however, this is not necessarily 
determinative of fairness since some purposes may require more substantial copying than 
others.216 In determining alternatives to the dealing, courts must consider whether there 
were non-copyrighted equivalents of the work that could have been used instead. Again, 
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some uses may require the specific work to be reproduced in order to effectively convey 
a certain message. With regards to the fifth factor, using an unpublished work instead of 
a published one may more easily constitute fair since the reproduction leads to wider 
public dissemination of the work which is “one of the goals of copyright law”.217 
However, if the work in question is confidential (such as private letters, etc.) then the 
dealing might not be fair. And lastly, the effect of the dealing on the work assesses 
whether the reproduced work competes with the market of the original work.  
 
The Supreme Court emphasized that the six factors are neither an exhaustive list nor 
should one of them be seen as more determinative than the others.218 The effect of CCH 
to Canadian copyright law is profound. The Court considered limitations and exceptions 
to copyright to be as important as exclusive rights. Both exclusive rights and limitations 
and exceptions should be seen as fundamental to the aim of creating and disseminating 
more works, and thus they must be balanced accordingly. This essentially requires 
Canadian courts to adopt a proportionality-based test in a similar fashion to the law in the 
EU.219 However, at the time of the CCH decision, Canadian fair dealing did not contain 
the purposes of parody, satire or education. In 2012, The Copyright Modernization Act 
amended the fair dealing provision to include these and soon after the Supreme Court 
handed down several copyright decisions that further reaffirmed the importance of 
interpreting limitations and exceptions broadly.  
 
In SOCAN v. Bell Canada, the Supreme Court held that the use of short 30- to 90-second 
preview snippets of musical works in online purchasing was justified under the purpose 
of research.220 The Court reiterated how the dissemination of works “is central to 
developing a robustly cultured and intellectual public domain” and that users’ rights play 
an essential part in fulfilling the public interest goals of the Copyright Act.221 The Court 
interpreted the purpose of research under fair dealing very broadly:  
 
“Limiting research to creative purposes would also run counter to the ordinary 
meaning of ‘research’, which can include many activities that do not demand the 
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establishment of new facts or conclusions. It can be piecemeal, informal, 
exploratory, or confirmatory. It can in fact be undertaken for no purpose except 
personal interest. It is true that research can be for the purpose of reaching new 
conclusions, but this should be seen as only one, not the primary component of 
the definitional framework”.222  
 
In a similar case, Alberta (Education) v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency, 
concerning the copying of materials by teachers, the Supreme Court interpreted ‘private 
study’ to cover a wide range of activities: “With respect, the word “private” in ‘private 
study’ should not be understood as requiring users to view copyrighted works in splendid 
isolation. Studying and learning are essentially personal endeavors, whether they are 
engaged in with others or in solitude”.223  
 
Amending the fair dealing provision to cover more purposes was a vital development, 
however, its effects would not be the same without the innovative finding in CCH. 
Through the broad interpretation, a wide range of user-derived content may rely on the 
listed purposes. Education, in particular, warrants a specific mention since user-generated 
content has become an important method in promoting media literacy and engaging 
students and young people for various educational goals.224 The Court’s finding in 
Alberta (Education) that ‘private study’ covers a very broad range of activities implies 
that this is most likely also the case for the purpose of education.225  
 
The first assessment of the new parody purpose under fair dealing and under the CCH 
ratio occurred in a 2017 Federal Court case United Airlines Inc. v. Jeremy Cooperstock. 
Cooperstock was the owner-operator of a consumer criticism website called Untied.com 
which targeted the commercial aviation company United Airlines. The website 
reproduced the logo of the United Airlines, with some modifications, and the website’s 
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layout, colors, fonts and other elements were highly similar to United Airline’s official 
website. There was a disclaimer on the site telling visitors that it was not the official 
website of the aviation company. The Federal Court stated that since Canadian copyright 
law does not define the content, meaning or scope of parody, the fair dealing provision 
“must be read in [its] entire context and in [its] grammatical and ordinary sense 
harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of 
Parliament”.226  
 
As in Michelin, the Court referred to the dictionary definition of parody, but deviated 
from previous case-law by stating that a parody does not need to target the work that is 
being borrowed.227 The Court stated that while the meaning of parody established in 
Campbell (“the use of some elements of a prior author’s composition to create a new one 
that, at least in part, comments on that author’s work”) is useful, it must be approached 
cautiously given the differences between the fair use doctrine in the US and fair dealing 
in Canada.228 Interestingly, the Court instead endorsed the characteristics of parody 
established in the European Union case Deckmyn v. Vandersteen –that parody must 1) 
invoke an existing work whilst being noticeably different from it, and 2) constitute an 
expression of humor or mockery. The Court stated that the finding in Deckmyn reflects 
“the ordinary meaning of the term, the purpose, and scheme of the fair dealing provisions 
in [the Copyright Act 1985], and the intention of the Parliament”.229  
 
Under the Deckmyn requirements Cooperstock’s website qualified as parody. However, 
the use did not pass the fairness analysis. The Court found that particularly the purpose, 
the amount and the effect of the dealing weighed against fairness. When analyzing the 
real motive behind the appropriation, the defendant’s intent was not to engage in parody, 
but rather to embarrass and punish United Airlines “for its perceived wrongdoings”.230 
The website copied almost the entirety of the United Airlines official website in its 
likeness and thus the copying was substantial, in both qualitative and quantitative terms, 
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which weighed heavily against the defendant.231 The Court admitted that “when 
considering parody, available alternatives to the dealing cannot be weighed too heavily” 
since it might affect the effectiveness of the message that is meant to be conveyed.232 
However, the substantial and near unaltered use of the original work and “mean-spirited” 
copying were not seen as necessary to meet the purpose of humorously criticizing the 
company. According to the Court, other alternatives could have been used, with more 
explicit use of humorous parodic elements. Concerning the effect of the dealing, the use 
was not considered to have a harmful economic effect per se, but the intent was to cause 
harm to the professional reputation of United Airlines.233 
 
Given the parody purpose should not be interpreted narrowly, this enables a wider range 
of parodies to rely on the fair dealing provision. Parodies can be non-critical or more 
expressive of paying homage than conveying mockery or humor, and importantly, as 
confirmed in United Airlines, do not necessarily have to target the work being borrowed 
but can rather comment on something external to the work. This removes a significant 
hurdle for many user-derived works and allows for different forms of appropriation and 
subversive expressions. These types of parodies would not have qualified for protection 
under the previous fair dealing provision or pre-CCH interpretation. 
 
The Canadian courts have, and even more so than the US courts, explicitly noted user’s 
rights and the importance of limitations and exceptions for users and their subsequent ties 
to copyright policy objectives, while still notionally having a less open-ended doctrine 
than fair use. Both jurisdictions seem to allocate some weight to the user’s motive behind 
using the work, as seen in Rogers and Blanch in the US and in United Airlines in Canada. 
The fairness factors for fair dealing are very similar to the ones listed in fair use, but in 
Canada their assessment is guided by more explicit understanding and interpretation of 
the position of users. Similarities can be seen in Cariou and Campbell regarding fair use, 
but the connection is not quite as direct. Alberta and SOCAN demonstrate how the wide 
interpretation of the different fair dealing purposes could likely also cover a range of user-
derived works. As in the case of fair use, the substantiality and amount of appropriation 
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is a possible restriction for user-generated content and near identical copying is unlikely 
to pass as fair, as shown in Michelin and United Airlines. 
 
4.2.2. Assessing the fair dealing provision 
 
Canadian courts have numerously emphasized the differences between the US fair use 
and Canadian fair dealing234, but the distinction is less clear than before. Indeed, Michael 
Geist argues that the Canadian fair dealing has shifted much closer to fair use since the 
listed purposes under fair dealing can be interpreted much more broadly.235 The first stage 
of the fair dealing analysis is now easier to pass and the emphasis has shifted to the second 
stage with an actual analysis of fairness. Fair dealing can still be seen to categorically 
exclude uses which do not fall under the exhaustive list of enumerated purposes in the 
provision, and this may negatively impact the development of new forms of expression 
and creativity.236 However, the fact that limitations and exceptions have been elevated to 
the same level as exclusive rights and that they must be given a wide interpretation in 
order to ensure users’ rights, makes the current regime significantly more supportive of 
user-generated content than before.   
 
Generally, the Canadian fair dealing provision seems to comply with the three-step test. 
The use of a work must be for one of the listed purposes under the provision which fulfills 
the first step of the test. However, since the fair dealing provision must now be interpreted 
broadly in order to not unduly restrict users’ rights, one could question whether it 
sufficiently meets the first step. Nevertheless, the existence of the first ‘hurdle’, even if 
in a somewhat looser form, should satisfy the first step. The six non-exhaustive fairness 
factors endorsed in CCH allow for a deeper analysis that take into account the economic 
and non-economic interests of the rightsholder and weigh them against the fairness of the 
use, and thus enable the fair dealing provision to satisfy the second and third steps. 
 
Freedom of expression is guaranteed by section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (CCFR): “Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms… freedom of 
 
234 Michelin, see footnote no. 208; United Airlines, para. 116; SOCAN, para. 26. 
235 Geist, 2013, p. 176. 
236 Katz, Ariel. "Fair Use 2.0: The Rebirth of Fair Dealing in Canada." The Copyright Pentalogy, 
edited by Michael Geist, University of Ottawa Press, 2013, p. 140. 
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thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media 
of communication…”.237 Rights and freedoms are subject “only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”.238 
This is similar to the approaches in the European Convention of Human Rights and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.239 Freedom of expression should 
be interpreted liberally, but it does not extend to expressions that are hostile or 
inconsistent with the values contained in the Canadian Charter. 240 Political, religious, 
artistic or commercial expressions “should not be suppressed except in cases where urgent 
and compelling reasons exist and then only to the extent and for the time necessary for 
the protection of the community”.241 In Michelin, the Court decided the defendant’s right 
to freedom of expression under section 2(b) CCFR was not restricted and that the 
reproduction of the Michelin man logo could not be justified based on freedom of 
expression grounds. The Court considered that the defendant could have conveyed their 
message using different means and not have reproduced the logo in such a substantial 
fashion.242 The Court stated similarly in United Airlines and deemed the defendant’s 
insincerity behind the use to also support this finding. Based on the current case-law, 
parodies and appropriation in general continue to face a hurdle based on the substantiality 
of the borrowing.  
 
4.2.3. Assessing the UGC exception 
 
The specific exception for non-commercial user-generated content enables users to create 
and disseminate user-derived content without having to obtain authorization from the 
rightsholder. The text of the provision indicates that the creator of the UGC work must 
be an individual, thus it seems that corporate entities would not be able to rely on the 
exception but are instead covered by the (somewhat narrower) fair dealing provision. The 
 
237 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms [‘CCFR’], Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
238 CCFR, section 1.  
239 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
['ECtHR'], as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, Art. 10(2); Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union ['EUCFR'], 26 October 2012, 2012/C 326/02, Art. 
52(1).  
240 R v. Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697; Jacques, 2017, p. 156. 
241 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General) [1989] 1 SCR 927. 
242 Michelin, see discussion ‘(vi) Summary on the scope of Protection under Section 2(b)’.  
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provision also allows for persons other than the individual to disseminate the work. The 
non-commercial status of the new work is assessed from the point of view of the 
individual user, not the disseminator, which might suggest that the authorized 
disseminator could perhaps even profit from the work.243 However, if the creator of the  
user-derived work may not profit from it, then it seems rather counter-intuitive that the 
possible disseminator could do this instead. Courts will still have to interpret the provision 
in line with, and whilst balancing, the interest of both rightsholders and users. Considering 
the UGC exception focuses on an individual user, it also brings up the question whether 
the provision extends to collaboratively made user-generated works.244 If not, many types 
of works could be left outside the scope of the exception. Wikis and encyclopedia-type 
UGC works would possibly still be able to rely on the fair dealing provision, particularly 
under the purposes of research or private study which, at any rate, would be interpreted 
liberally. 
 
Under the provision, the work being borrowed must have been already “published or 
otherwise made available to the public”. Thus, works such as private letters or journals 
likely cannot be used in UGC works.245 The creator of the UGC work must also have 
reasonable grounds to believe the existing work itself does not infringe copyright. The 
provision states that the source of the existing work should be mentioned “if it is 
reasonable in the circumstances to do so”. “Reasonable” is not defined, but it could 
possibly depend on the level of professionalism of the UGC work in order to prevent and 
clear suspicion about market substitution. Since user-derived content uses appropriation 
to convey certain messages and to participate in cultural discourse, the source of the 
existing work is usually familiar to other users and in such a situation an attribution would 
likely be unnecessary. Thus, the attribution requirement in the provision seems flexible 
and allows for a multitude of UGC works, but also protects rightsholders’ interests. The 
UGC work created by the individual must be a new work. The provision dismisses “from 
the scope of the exception ‘works’ that are either mere copies of existing works or that 
are barely modified copies”.246 The user-derived work, thus, needs to bear some 
differences to the existing work and show a sufficient original contribution from the user. 
 
243 Scassa., 2013, p. 437. 
244 Ibid., pp. 438-439. 
245 Ibid., p. 439. 
246 Ibid., p. 440. 
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Pirated works and identical copies uploaded and shared online, even when non-
commercial, continue to remain outside the scope of protection of limitations and 
exceptions to copyright. In general, the Canadian exception for non-commercial user-
generated content allows for the broad use and dissemination of user-derived works as 
long as certain conditions are met.  
 
However, the exception can still be criticized for not going far enough. Subsection (1)(a) 
of the exception (“solely non-commercial purpose”) could pose significant limitations for 
the use and dissemination of use-generated works. It is not clear what type of users fall 
under the provision. This is particularly problematic since the lines between commercial 
and non-commercial UGC works are increasingly harder to determine and the skills, 
capabilities and even the prominence of different users vary widely. Additionally, since 
the UGC exception “characterizes the ‘user’… as one who makes [use of] copyright-
protected works of others… it [in fact] perpetuates the myth that the regular ‘creator’ does 
not borrow from or use the works of others”.247 For example, would professional 
individuals who create a UGC work be covered if the work itself is non-commercial? 
What ‘non-commercial’ means will still likely be assessed on a case-by-case basis, which 
does not remove the uncertainties that users face over the legality of their content. It is 
also possible that the courts will inspect the ulterior motive, similarly to fair dealing, 
behind the use of the borrowed work. Those who merely exploit the original work to gain 
commercial exposure or engage in nefarious use would likely not be able to rely on the 
exception.  
 
In terms of the three-step test, the UGC exception could be criticized as being too broad 
for the first step. Under the exception, a work may be made for any purpose as long as it 
is non-commercial. The range of user-derived works online and the various motivations 
behind their creation and dissemination would, however, be impossible to list 
exhaustively in any provision, since they include anything “from making a home video 
of a friend or family member dancing to a popular song and posting it online” to “creating 
[mash-ups] of video clips”. At any rate, an exception would have to be interpreted broadly 
based on CCH. Sub-section (1)(d) of the UGC exception states that the use or 
dissemination of the new work must “not have a substantial adverse effect, financial or 
 
247 Scassa, 2013, p. 437. 
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otherwise, on the exploitation, or potential exploitation of the existing work or on an 
existing or potential market for it”. This likely ensures that the second and third steps of 
the three-step test are met. The meaning of ‘substantial adverse effect’ is not defined. One 
could assume that a non-commercial UGC work cannot have a substantial adverse effect 
financially in the first place. It is unclear whether user-derived content with a higher 
production value or more popular works that ‘take a life of their own’ could be understood 
as having a substantial adverse effect on the exploitation of the work. 
 
To conclude, under Canadian copyright law, user-derived content benefits from both fair 
dealing and the non-commercial UGC exception as defenses, or rather as “rights”. In 
terms of commercialization, fair dealing is broader since it allows for both non-
commercial and commercial uses. The amending of fair dealing to include more purposes 
has strengthened it further. Under the UGC exception, however, the purpose of the use 
(other than it having to be non-commercial) is not defined. The inclusion of a UGC 
exception is significant. It is drafted in a way that understands and even encourages the 
production and dissemination of user-generated content, much in the way of a ‘life-form’ 
that spreads freely and continuously as Barlow described. The exception is an affirmation 
about the value that user-derived content brings to the development of political, social 
and self-actualizing aspects for individuals and the society at large. As Geist describes, 
Canada “remains the only country in the world where the highest court has positively 
(and repeatedly) affirmed the principle of users’ rights within copyright law”.248  
 
Concerns and uncertainties about the limits of non-commercial and commercial uses are, 
however, still present. It is possible that more ‘amateurish’ works may be able to rely on 
the UGC exception, whereas more professional works hinging on the line of commercial 
will more likely rely on fair dealing. This evidently limits uses to a narrower list of 
purposes but enables for a more in-depth analysis of fairness which may be deservedly 
called for in some cases. This should ease the minds of rightsholders to some extent. 
Undoubtedly, the most important legal rule supporting the production and spread of user-
generated content, is the finding in CCH that limitations and exceptions must be 
considered as users’ rights. Subsequently, limitations and exceptions are for users what 
exclusive rights are for authors and copyright owners, and both are tied to the policy aims 
 
248 Geist, Michael. "The Canadian Copyright Story." Copyright Law in an Age of Limitations and 
Exceptions, edited by Ruth L. Okediji, Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 173.  
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of copyright itself. This interpretation also makes such cases subject to a proportionality 
analysis. In many ways this is similar to the system in the EU and countries adhering to 
the European Convention on Human Rights. The Canadian courts’ proneness to discuss 
solutions from other jurisdictions, such as in United Airlines even explicitly endorsing 
the parody definition found in Deckmyn, could offer some interesting lessons for the 
development of copyright law in the EU.  
 
4.3. The European Union – quotation and parody exceptions 
 
In general, the continental European approach and to an extent the EU copyright law are 
based on the natural law focus of droit d'auteur that provides broad and strong exclusive 
rights. The Information Society Directive sets out an exhaustive list of limitations and 
exceptions of which all but one (exemption for temporary acts of reproduction in Article 
5(1); the Orphan Works Directive 2012/28/EU has also added another mandatory 
exception for the use of orphan works, ie. copyright-protected works whose rightsholders 
are unknown, for certain purposes) are currently non-mandatory for Member States to 
implement in their national laws. In order to ensure harmonization within the Union, 
Member States cannot implement exceptions that are beyond the list provided in the 
Directive. The list contains several, and some very specific, limitations and exceptions. 
Some may pertain to user-generated content more than others, such as private copying, 
illustration for teaching or scientific research or use for the purpose of research or private 
study.249 However, the most relevant ones concerning user-derived content in the scope 
of this thesis, are the quotation and parody exceptions. Member States may provide for 
exceptions or limitations to the exclusive rights provided in the Information Society 
Directive in cases of:  
 
“[Art. 5(3)(d)] quotations for purposes such as criticism or review, provided that 
they relate to a work or other subject-matter which has already been lawfully 
made available to the public, that, unless this turns out to be impossible, the 
source, including the author's name, is indicated, and that their use is in 
accordance with fair practice, and to the extent required by the specific purpose; 
… 
 
249 InfoSoc Directive, Arts. 5(2)(b), 5(3)(a), 5(3)(n). 
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[Art. 5(3)(k)] use for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche”. 
 
As part of the implementation of the DSM Directive, the above exceptions must now be 
made mandatory in all Member States. As opposed to the US and Canada, the European 
Union has implemented the three-step test into its copyright law via the Information 
Society Directive:  
 
“[Art. 5(5)] The exceptions and limitations provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 
4 [of Art. 5 InfoSoc] shall only be applied in certain special cases which do not 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder”. 
 
The implementation of the three-step test is significant as to the scope of the limitations 
and exceptions provided for in EU copyright law. In the famous Infopaq case, the CJEU 
described limitations and exceptions as “derogations from the general principle [of 
exclusive rights]”, meaning that the status of exceptions is evidently lesser compared to 
exclusive rights. Since they are ‘derogations’, limitations and exceptions must be 
interpreted strictly, and the Court emphasized that the role of the three-step test in 
ensuring rightsholders’ interests further supports this interpretation.250 In combination 
with strict interpretation of limitations and exceptions, the EU three-step test weighs the 
balancing test in favor of the rightsholders. 
 
4.3.1. EU case-law 
 
The case-law of the CJEU has important implications to the scope and interpretation of 
limitations and exceptions to copyright under EU law. The Infopaq ratio continues to 
remain a general foundation in EU copyright law, however, in more recent case-law the 
CJEU has found methods to interpret limitations and exceptions in a somewhat more 
liberal manner. In Murphy, the Court did confirm a general requirement for strict 
interpretation, but also cited Recital 31 of the InfoSoc Directive and stated that the 
interpretation of an exception “must enable [its] effectiveness… and permit observance 
of the exception’s purpose”. In addition, an exception “must allow and ensure the 
 
250 Infopaq, paras. 56-58. 
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development and operation of new technologies and safeguard a fair balance between 
the rights and interests of rightsholders… and users of protected works who wish to avail 
themselves of those new technologies… (emphasis added)”.251 Similarly, in Painer, the 
Court reaffirmed both of these findings.252 In addition, the quotation exception, which 
was at stake in Painer, is intended to strike a fair balance between the right to freedom of 
expression of users and the reproduction right of authors.253 Interestingly, the Court 
considers that a quotation, in the scope of the Article, should be accompanied by comment 
or criticism.254 Article 5(3)(d) InfoSoc does, however, explicitly contain the wording 
“such as”. Comment and criticism easily pertain to freedom of expression interests and 
possibly hence the linkage. However, it is less clear whether this extends to the more 
subversive or discourse-related quotations present in appropriation art and user-derived 
content. Thus, whilst the narrow interpretation of L&Es is the norm, the CJEU has 
generally attested that a fair balance must be ensured and that the exceptions’ 
effectiveness should not be undermined. 
 
In the Deckmyn parody case, the CJEU however endorsed a wider interpretation of the 
exception and once again emphasized the need to ensure the effectiveness of the exception 
through balancing interests.  Deckmyn, a member of the far-right Vlaams Belang party in 
Belgium, had reproduced a drawing with some alterations from the cover of the Belgian 
Suske en Wiske comic book series. The Court held parody to be an autonomous concept 
under EU law and defined the essential characteristics of parody as: 1) to evoke an 
existing work while being noticeably different from it, and 2) to constitute an expression 
of humor or mockery.255 Supposedly, humorous intent suffices, since it may be 
impossible and inappropriate for the judiciary to assess whether there was a humorous 
effect.256 It is not apparent from the usual meaning of ‘parody’ in everyday language that 
it would be subject to other conditions. A parody does not need to “display an original 
character of its own, other than that of displaying noticeable differences with respect to 
the original parodied work”, and neither is it subject to “[having to relate] to the original 
 
251 Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Murphy and Others, joined cases 
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253 Ibid., para. 135; Rosati, 2019, p. 135. 
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255 Deckmyn, para. 20. 
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work itself or mention the source of the parodied work”.257 Thus, a parody does not need 
to constitute an original work in itself and the parodic expression does not necessarily 
have to target the reproduced work, and can instead comment on something external to 
the work. In line with previous case-law, the Court connected the exception with a 
fundamental rights concern. The parody exception implicates a freedom of expression 
interest and thus a fair balance must be struck between the exclusive rights of authors and 
the freedom of expression of the user relying on Art. 5(3)(k).258 Nevertheless, all 
circumstances need to be taken to account, and if the use of a work and the expression is 
made in a discriminatory nature, as was the case in Deckmyn, this weighs against the user 
relying on the parody exception.259 This wider interpretation of the parody exception is a 
welcome development from the perspective of user-generated content, although the 
requirement for humorous intent and substantial linkage with freedom of expression 
concerns may serve as obstacles. If ‘pastiche’ (also included in Art. 5(3)(k) InfoSoc) is 
interpreted similarly, it could be an avenue for the protection of expressions that pay 
homage (without incorporating humorous elements) through appropriation. 
 
A recent case bearing the most parallels with user-derived content is the preliminary 
ruling in Pelham. Music producer Moses Pelham had sampled in his work a two-second 
sequence from Kraftwerk’s song Metall auf Metall without authorization. The sample 
played as a continuous background loop in Pelham’s work. The Court stated that the 
reproduction by a user of a sound sample, “even if very short”, amounts to a reproduction 
“in part”.260 The Court once again reaffirmed the importance of balancing interests and 
stated that, from a fundamental rights perspective, intellectual property rights are not 
absolute rights even when enshrined in Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union (EUCFR).261 Freedom of the arts, enshrined in Article 13 of the  
EU Charter, falls within the scope of freedom of expression in Article 11 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Court admitted that sampling constitutes a 
 
257 Deckmyn, para. 21; Jacques, 2019, p. 129. 
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form of artistic expression that is covered by Article 13 of the Charter, and thus also 
implicates Article 11 ECHR.262 Interestingly, however, the Court differentiated between 
samples that are recognizable and those that are unrecognizable to the ear in the new 
work.263 According to the Court, the former constitutes a reproduction, whereas the latter 
does not. With regards to the quotation exception, the CJEU stated that an essential 
characteristic of a quotation is that the user of a protected work “[must have] the intention 
of entering into ‘dialogue’ with that work”.264 The Court did not elaborate further on the 
meaning of ‘dialogue’ but attested that it cannot exist if the work being used is 
unrecognizable in the appropriative work, and thus the scope of the quotation exception 
does not extend to such situations. What the Court seems to set out here is that a quotation 
must serve a certain purpose, such as “illustrating an assertion, of defending an opinion 
or of allowing an intellectual comparison between [the original work] and the assertions 
of [the] user”.265 User-derived works may often be considered to be “in dialogue” with 
the borrowed work, however, the CJEU’s description possibly still alludes to quotations 
that have a critical or commentative undertone.  
 
Notably, German copyright law allows for so-called ‘free use’: “an independent work 
created in the free use of the work of another person may be published and exploited 
without the consent of the author [whose work is being used]”, though this does not apply 
in the case of musical works “in which a melody is recognizably taken from the work and 
used as the basis for a new work”.266 However, since there exists no equivalent of ‘free 
use’ in the EU, the Court was asked whether it is consistent with EU copyright law. 
According to the referring court free use is “based on the idea that it is not possible to 
conceive of a cultural creation without that creation building upon the previous work of 
other authors”.267 However, the Court stated that in order to ensure consistency within the 
Union, the Member States cannot provide for exceptions and limitations that are beyond 
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those expressly set out in the Information Society Directive.268 Pelham aptly demonstrates 
the inflexible nature of the EU copyright regime. 
 
The recent EU case-law does acknowledge the position of the user and the role of 
effective limitations and exceptions in safeguarding user’s interests, but to a much lesser 
extent than the US and especially Canada. In addition, these acknowledgments are not 
tied to the recognition that user-derived expression could contribute to the overarching 
policy goals of copyright in creating and disseminating more works, as has been the case 
in the two other jurisdictions. Rather, they primarily relate to fundamental rights 
(particularly freedom of expression) as seen in Deckmyn regarding parody and in Painer 
and Pelham about quotation. The inflexibility of the EU system by rejecting the German 
free use rule because of harmonization concerns and the existing derogation rule deriving 
from Infopaq both mean that the limitations and exceptions under EU law cannot be 
interpreted as widely. Thus, when compared to US and Canada, the position of users and 
user-derived works are generally in a weaker position than the rightsholders. 
 
4.3.2. Assessing the EU L&E framework 
 
In general, the more specific and narrowly interpreted limitations and exceptions in EU 
law are considered to provide more legal certainty than the open-ended fair use doctrine 
in the US and the semi-open-ended fair dealing provision and liberally interpreted 
exceptions in Canada. In addition, the open-ended three-step test in EU law is understood 
to further constrain the already narrow limitations and exceptions. Simultaneously, 
however, the strict interpretation doctrine makes EU copyright legislation less equipped 
to respond to new types of uses and technologies, such as appropriative expressions and 
the spread of user-generated content. P. Bernt Hugenholtz describes the result as an 
“increasing mismatch [in the EU] between the law of copyright and emerging social 
norms [that are shaped, at least in part, by the state of technology]”.269 Since limitations 
and exceptions are still regarded as derogations to the general rule (i.e. exclusive rights), 
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the current approach in EU does not focus on users’ rights in a similar way as Canada 
does, even if a balancing test and an assessment of the purpose are still required. 
 
The focus on fundamental rights is a core part of the balancing of interests between the 
rightsholder and the user. Both intellectual property and freedom of expression are 
contained respectively in Articles 17(2) and 11 of the EU Charter and in Articles 1 of the 
First Protocol and 11 of the ECHR. In addition, freedom of the arts is listed in Article 13 
of EUCFR. Although a fundamental rights focus is an important method for the judiciary 
to balance interests and allow certain types of creative expressions, it is apparent that the 
protected expressions pertain largely to cases where a particularly important speech 
interest is at stake. As previously discussed in Chapter 2, these interests are generally 
considered to relate more to political and critical expressions. Thus, much of user-
generated content is left outside the scope of the existing and inflexible, as shown in 
Pelham, list of limitations and exceptions in EU law.270 EU copyright legislation does not 
contain similar flexibilities that are provided by (semi)open-ended exceptions, such as 
fair use or fair dealing or the liberal interpretation of “users’ rights”, thus it is less likely 
to be able to extend protection to a vast range of user-derived content. 
 
5. USER-GENERATED CONTENT IN EU COPYRIGHT LAW – POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS 
 
To summarize, the EU copyright legislation lacks the mechanisms and flexibilities to 
effectively respond to and protect the new user-generated types of expressions prominent 
in the Web 2.0. EU copyright law has, however, undergone several reforms with the most 
recent major one being the adoption of the Digital Single Market Directive in 2019. 
Further reforms addressing the sphere of user-generated content should not be considered 
non-viable. The Canadian approach that includes adopting a specific exception for non-
commercial user-generated content and broadening the interpretation of limitations and 
exceptions through case-law could also be a possible route in the EU. 271 Based on the 
analyzed cases, some convergence can be seen between the jurisdictions, such as favoring 
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a similar definition to parody and Canada having essentially adopted a proportionality-
based analysis between exclusive rights and limitations and exceptions. 
 
Recital 70 of the DSM Directive explicitly states that users “should be allowed to upload 
and make available content generated by users for the specific purposes of quotation, 
criticism, review, caricature, parody or pastiche”. As discussed previously, these 
exceptions still fail to effectively cover the various forms of user-derived content. 
Enlarging the existing exceptions, such as parody or quotation, is unlikely to provide a 
solution as the strict interpretation doctrine will not allow for an extensive understanding 
of them.  
 
A clear-cut solution would then be to adopt a new specific exception for non-commercial 
user-generated content, much akin to Canada. It outlines a specific and somewhat stable 
category of use, which is the preferred approach under EU copyright law and continental 
civil law traditions in general. There have already been discussions about the viability of 
an exception for user-generated content in the EU.272 Influenced by the Canadian 
exception, the specific exception would allow a user to use an existing copyrighted work 
in the creation of a user-derived work and authorize its dissemination, if both are done 
for non-commercial purposes, with the source indicated if reasonable. The exception 
would be subject to the three-step test and thus the effects on authors’ and copyright 
owners’ exclusive rights will also be assessed. These balanced with the interests of the 
user, and addressing the possible fundamental rights concerns related to freedom of 
expression and the arts, would also allow courts to assess the various motivations behind 
the creation of a user-derived work. In the current regime, there remains a risk that the 
more political and critical expressions are still favored even under an exception for non-
commercial UGC. User-derived content would be interpreted strictly. Additionally, the 
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determination of what constitutes commercial or non-commercial would likely be 
challenging and assessed on a case-by-case basis. 
 
The most optimal approach, however, would be the addition of a specific exception in 
combination with a semi-open-ended exception governing the limitations and exceptions 
provided for under EU copyright legislation. Based on such a system, legislatures would 
be more equipped to also address unforeseen uses of copyrighted works. The idea of 
introducing a more open-ended exception into EU copyright law is frequently criticized 
based on the ‘incompatibilities’ between common and civil legal traditions in relation to 
copyright and the fear of increase in legal uncertainty. The type of semi-open-ended 
exception inspired by the Canadian legislation could, however, be a “third way” between 
the inflexible EU and the fully open-ended US approaches.273 It is also uncertain how 
much of a gap in reality exists between the European and Anglo-American, especially 
Canadian, regimes. Martin Senftleben argues that “the alleged inability” of civil law 
judges in applying flexible and open-ended copyright provisions is not a valid argument 
against the adoption of a semi-open-ended exception.274 At the very least, harmonization 
via international law will have resulted in some convergence, and a shift towards a 
balancing test between rightsholder and user interests can be seen in all the discussed 
jurisdictions.275 The DSM Directive has reaffirmed this balancing principle in the 
recitals.276 The balancing test in the EU is, however, weighed from the outset towards the 
side of rightsholders based on the strict interpretation of both L&Es and the three-step 
test. The CJEU, in its case-law, has not shown to be incapable of applying open-ended 
exceptions and indeed, in the field of copyright, the three-step test itself constitutes one. 
 
273 Lambrecht et al, 2016, p. 32. 
274 Senftleben, Martin. "The Perfect Match: Civil Law Judges and Open-Ended Fair Use 
Provision". American University International Law Review, vol. 33, no. 1, 2017, pp. 253, 255, 
262, 284. 
275 Lambrecht et al, 2016, p. 32. 
276 DSM Directive, Recital 70: “The steps taken by online content-sharing service providers in 
cooperation with rightholders should be without prejudice to the application of exceptions or 
limitations to copyright, including, in particular, those which guarantee the freedom of expression 
of users. Users should be allowed to upload and make available content generated by users for 
the specific purposes of quotation, criticism, review, caricature, parody or pastiche. That is 
particularly important for the purposes of striking a balance between the fundamental rights laid 
down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), in particular 
the freedom of expression and the freedom of the arts, and the right to property, including 
intellectual property.” 
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Legal certainty would be guaranteed by following relevant case precedents. The notion 
that open-ended or semi-open-ended exceptions lead to significant legal uncertainty is 
also undermined by the finding that such cases often form fairly consistent clusters and 
patterns.277 
 
The EU copyright regime would benefit from complementing its exhaustive list of 
limitations and exceptions with a semi-open-ended exception, akin to the extended 
Canadian fair dealing doctrine resulting from the CCH decision. This combination would 
provide legal certainty in the sense of a closed list of purposes but still be flexible in terms 
of interpretation. The imperative step for the CJEU would be to remove the strict 
interpretation for limitations and exceptions by no longer depicting them as “derogations” 
and instead elevating them to the same level as exclusive rights. The CJEU in its case-
law and the EU legislature in the InfoSoc and DSM recitals have repeatedly stated the 
importance of balancing interests and have recognized a connection between users’ 
interests and fundamental rights. In order to effectively balance between these interests, 
it is doubtful how exceptions could still be considered as merely derogations, especially 
if they are laden with fundamental rights concerns or considered to be vital for the 
dissemination and production of more works. The latter is an objective that the Union has 
increasingly emphasized, particularly in light of the internal market.278  
 
Niva Elkin-Koren describes a “user-rights approach” to copyright, which shares 
similarities with the Canadian regime, that shifts the emphasis from exclusive rights to a 
better understanding of creative processes themselves and the various parts that authors 
and users play in these. A user-rights approach recognizes the role of users in promoting 
the goals of copyright and places permissible uses on the same level as exclusive rights – 
they should be defined as rights rather than as mere defenses.279 The current narrow legal 
framework for limitations and exceptions accepts the scope of exclusive rights as a given 
and thus cannot counterbalance against the “rapid expansion of copyrights" or properly 
"safeguard user liberties in the digital environment”.280  
 
 
277 Hugenholtz, 2017, p. 282. 
278 Lambrecht et al, 2016, p. 31; DSM Directive, Recital 2.  
279 Elkin-Koren, 2017, p. 134.  
280 Ibid., p. 140. 
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In addition to the CJEU recognizing the pertinent need for balancing, a slight modification 
or rather “re-calibration” of the EU copyright legislation’s wording could be a solution. 
Senftleben suggests modifying the EU three-step test in Article 5(5) InfoSoc into the 
following:  
 
“In certain special cases comparable to those reflected by the exceptions and 
limitations provided for [in Art. 5(1)-(4)], the use of works or other subject-matter 
may also be exempted from [the exclusive rights in Arts. 2 and 3], provided that 
such use does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-
matter and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
rightholder (emphasis added).”281  
 
A similar suggestion was introduced by the Wittem Project on a European Copyright 
Code, a collaboration by European copyright scholars concerning the future of European 
copyright law. In the Code, limitations and exceptions are listed into four different 
categories, with three of them being particularly relevant to user-derived content, namely: 
(1) uses with minimal economic significance; (2) uses for the purpose of freedom of 
expression and information; and (3) uses permitted to promote social, political and 
cultural objectives. Another section allows for uses which are “comparable” to the uses 
enumerated in the above categories (given they do not conflict with normal exploitation 
or unreasonably prejudice the rightsholder’s legitimate interests).282 Such re-wording of 
the three-step test is still likely compliant, since at the very least the uses are confined to 
“certain special cases” that are comparable to the existing purposes. These modifications 
would provide the type of flexibility and adaptability required in the Web 2.0 era. The 
three-step test itself does not need to be interpreted strictly. Assessing the financial harm 
or damage to the moral interests of the rightsholder can be done parallel to the analysis 
of users’ intent and purpose in using a copyrighted work. This approach may be different 
from the general understanding of the three-step test in the EU as it stands, but it is 
unlikely to be incompatible with the test itself.283  
 
 
 
281 Senftleben, 2017, p. 271.  
282 The Wittem Project. European Copyright Code. 2010, available at <ivir.nl/copyrightcode/ecc-
pdf/> [accessed  10 Mar 2020], Art. 5.1-5.5. 
283 Lambrecht, 2016, pp. 30, 33-34. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
A copyright system should not leave users in limbo over whether they can legally take 
part in the range of creative processes and expressions facilitated by the participatory 
web. At the same time, the concerns that authors may have over fair remuneration for 
their creative efforts are certainly valid. However, neither the numerous successive 
copyright reforms in past decades nor the “massive enhancement” of the scope of 
copyright owners’ rights have resulted in significant, or even fair, increases in monetary 
rewards for authors.284 The current discourse about value-gaps and the reforms listed in 
the Digital Single Market Directive in the EU are also unlikely to fully solve this situation. 
The more prominent threat for authors and copyright owners is large-scale digital and 
online piracy that distributes identical copies of works. The motivations behind online 
piracy are usually very different to the ones behind the production and dissemination of 
user-derived content. 
 
If one of the aims of copyright is to ensure the dissemination of works, it should be better 
enabled to acknowledge the role and value that both authors and users bring to the system. 
The substantial increase in the scope of exclusive rights at the expense of L&Es is not 
conducive to this goal. One solution is to adopt a specific exception for non-commercial 
user-generated content, as in Canada’s case. Complementing this, jurisdictions should 
also consider introducing a (semi-)open-ended exception that serves as the judiciary’s 
tool to interpret limitations and exceptions more flexibly and to respond to unforeseen 
uses as new technologies develop. The EU’s inflexible copyright regime would benefit 
from such a reform and it is less contradictory with the current state of EU legislation and 
case precedent than generally thought. These modifications would also send a strong 
normative message about the legitimacy, value and integral role of user creativity to the 
policy aims of copyright. Professional forms of authorship are unlikely to disappear, since 
many still enjoy consuming creative works in the ‘traditional’ way and are captivated by 
individuals with talent and expertise in their trade. 285 Copyright laws should, however, 
recognize that a multitude of creative processes and expressions exist in the Web 2.0 era. 
 
 
284 Litman, 2017, p. 130 
285 Ginsburg, 2017, p. 69. 
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The introduction of a specific exception or a more open-ended exception, or a 
combination of these, will not remove all the challenges facing user-derived content. The 
technological protection mechanisms meant to tackle digital and online piracy also 
indirectly impair the possibility of users to access and use a copyrighted work for 
permissible purposes. Digital copyright enforcement measures, particularly automated 
ones, have become prevalent on major online platforms but the respective bargaining 
power and resources of copyright owners and users are vastly different. Rightsholders 
should be compelled to assess in good faith whether the use of a work is covered by a 
limitation or exception before possibly requesting the content to be taken down. 
Generally, users also need to be more informed of their rights, since otherwise only the 
more prominent and influential users, and perhaps even corporate actors, are more likely 
to benefit from them.286 Thus, a wider-scale examination of the different aspects of 
copyright law that impact user-generated content is required in order to better understand 
the effects and normative potential of the exceptions analyzed in this thesis. 
 
286 Elkin-Koren, 2017, p. 162. 
